In the fierce competition among city-wide freight platforms, Lala has launched its third bid to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. However, beneath its glossy facade lie many hidden concerns. Lala's eagerness to go public and the inherent issues in its business model have raised doubts about whether it can successfully knock on the door of the capital market.

Lala's prospectus reveals that its total revenue has continued to grow in recent years, successfully turning a profit. However, this profitability is not based on robust business growth but rather on reduced sales and marketing expenses. More concerningly, Lala's profits primarily rely on the "blood transfusion" from its driver community. In Lala's business model, drivers must not only pay membership fees but also commissions after completing freight orders. This double squeeze continuously compresses drivers' profit margins.

Data shows that Lala's commission income as a percentage of total revenue has continued to grow, while membership fee revenue has declined. This indicates that Lala's revenue is increasingly reliant on driver commissions. The sustainability of this profit model is concerning, as excessive squeezing of driver interests may lead them to abandon the platform, draining Lala's transportation capacity and reducing order volumes, ultimately impacting profitability.

To break free from reliance on driver "blood transfusions," Lala has attempted to venture into multiple fields in search of new growth avenues. However, these efforts have yet to yield significant results.

In errand services, Lala offers a diverse range of delivery options but faces stiff competition from numerous city-wide instant delivery platforms, limiting its advantages. Additionally, Lala has invested heavily in vehicle manufacturing, but funding remains a significant challenge. Despite sustained growth in total revenue, Lala's profitability remains to be improved, posing risks to its investments in vehicle manufacturing.

Worse still, Lala attempted to venture into internet lending but soon faced regulatory scrutiny and market backlash. Its lending product, "Yuanyijie," was delisted less than half a month after its launch, casting a shadow over Lala's diversification strategy.

Lala's business model inherently limits its ability to constrain and manage drivers, positioning it merely as an intermediary. This leads to numerous safety and compliance issues, frequently embroiling it in controversy.

On consumer complaint websites, Lala faces a high volume of complaints, primarily concerning drivers reneging on orders, inflating prices during transport, and poor attitudes during disputes. Furthermore, Lala has been repeatedly criticized by regulatory authorities for issues such as arbitrary pricing changes, multiple charges, malicious undercutting, and excessive commission rates or membership fees. These unresolved issues have accelerated the decline of Lala's reputation.

More seriously, Lala has been accused of condoning overloading. If a driver discovers overloaded goods upon accepting an order and refuses to transport them, the platform deducts points from the driver's score. This practice essentially shifts the risk of overloading onto drivers, exacerbating tensions between them and the platform.

Lala's path to listing is fraught with obstacles and challenges. The sustainability of its profit model, the hindrance to diversification efforts, and the rapid decline in reputation pose significant hurdles to its future development. Balancing platform profitability with driver interests, identifying new growth avenues, and resolving conflicts with drivers are pressing issues for Lala. At this crucial juncture of its listing ambitions, Lala must deeply reflect on its problems and actively seek solutions, or its listing journey will remain uncertain.