Source: Duke Internet Society (ID: wlyxs888)

On September 14, Wang Qiangyu, the former Vice President of DingTalk, was appointed as Co-General Manager of Baiwang, with responsibilities for overseeing AI product strategy. Just three days later, on September 17, Chen Hang (also known by his alias Wu Zhao), the original founder of DingTalk, joined the same board as a non-executive director.

First, consider the individuals responsible for business operations, and then those who shape the strategy. This order of events holds far more significance than an annual salary of 100,000 yuan.

In my view, it's not that Alibaba cannot accommodate Chen Hang; rather, Alibaba's current strategic phase no longer necessitates someone in his specific role.

【An Annual Salary of 100,000 Yuan: The Negligible Value of Money】

The terms offered by Baiwang were straightforward and clear: no requirement for office attendance, no involvement in daily operations, an annual salary of 100,000 yuan, and no additional allowances.

Many people have seized upon this figure as a stark contrast, interpreting it as a sign of a once-prominent figure's decline or as indicative of an Alibaba-style layoff. However, both interpretations are misguided because they view a board seat through the lens of an employee's salary logic.

The responsibilities of a non-executive director at a Hong Kong-listed company are well-defined: attend board meetings, participate in major decisions, and bear no responsibility for daily operations. The corresponding compensation is inherently symbolic and unrelated to the individual's past achievements. The 100,000 yuan is for his industry insights and network connections, not for his time.

Therefore, the real question is not, "Why only 100,000 yuan?" but rather: Why would someone with twenty years of product experience and a user base in the hundreds of millions accept a position with no real power, no performance targets, and no involvement in business operations?

The answer may not be flattering: because it's the most suitable option for him given his current circumstances.

【Two Relinquishments of Power: Both Occurred at Strategic Turning Points】

Chen Hang's first relinquishment of DingTalk occurred after the implementation of the "Cloud-DingTalk Integration." DingTalk was fully integrated into the Cloud Intelligence Business Group, and he stepped down as CEO, surrendering core product decision-making power. The nature of this adjustment was clear: DingTalk transformed from an independent startup product into a front-end gateway for Alibaba Cloud services. The product was now tasked with driving traffic to cloud services, and its strategy had to align with the group's objectives.

Five years later, he was brought back under equally clear circumstances: DingTalk's growth had plateaued, and its AI transformation was struggling to gain traction. The group needed someone with an intuitive grasp of products to lead the development of the AI-native application ONE and launch a breakthrough campaign in office AI.

The stakes were high. At the DingTalk 8.0 launch event in August 2025, ONE was unveiled as the core product, featuring an intelligent information flow that "brings tasks to people" and was seen as a milestone in DingTalk's AI transformation. However, subsequent developments deviated from expectations: the project's positioning wavered, its features lacked alignment with enterprises' actual business processes, daily active users declined after an initial surge, and it was eventually split and merged into the Wukong Business Unit.

This was followed by the "Inside DingTalk" controversy. In June 2026, a former DingTalk product manager published a 75,000-word resignation essay, criticizing the highly centralized product decision-making, high-pressure management, and detachment from user needs.

A few days later, Alibaba's Partnership Committee made a rare public statement on the intranet, stating that such a management style was "not representative of Alibaba's culture."

The next day, personnel adjustments were made: Chen Hang stepped down, and Chen Yusen, a technologist born in 1992, took over.

From his return to his departure, the entire process lasted just fifteen months.

Notice the commonality in these two relinquishments of power: neither was due to issues with his personal style. Instead, they occurred because the group's strategic priorities had shifted, necessitating a change in decision-making authority. The first shift was from an independent product to an ecosystem gateway; the second was from product-driven to business-driven. Despite the five-year gap, the underlying logic remained consistent.

Even someone as influential as Zhang Xiaolong needs WeChat to maintain a high degree of ecological independence to uphold a product-centric approach. DingTalk, however, never had such independence from the outset. This was determined by its origins, not by any individual's personality.

【Two Unresolved Contradictions】

Many attribute this controversy to management style or the founder's assertiveness. However, upon closer inspection, this is not a people issue but rather two inevitable barriers that B2B products encounter as they mature. Regardless of who is in charge, these challenges are difficult to overcome.

The first barrier: the clash between a product-centric approach and group synergy.

DingTalk's rise from scratch was fueled by Chen Hang's exceptional product judgment and attention to detail. During the startup phase, this was a core competitive advantage. However, once the product became a piece on the group's strategic chessboard, it became a source of conflict.

The criticisms in "Inside DingTalk" about "executive-driven product development and detachment from user needs" essentially reflect this conflict: the founder wants to create a product he believes in, while the group wants a business that aligns with its overall strategy. When these directions diverge, the founder always compromises.

This is not unique to Alibaba. All major corporations' star products go through a process of founder exit, strategic alignment, and systematic management after the startup phase.

DingTalk simply progressed faster and more thoroughly in this regard.

The second barrier: scale does not necessarily lead to monetization.

This is a common issue across the entire office collaboration sector, not just DingTalk. Micro and small enterprises are price-sensitive and unwilling to pay; medium and large clients have customized needs and require in-depth industry solutions, an area where DingTalk cannot compete with traditional vendors like Yonyou, Kingdee, and SAP.

Acquiring new users for free is easy, but getting customers to pay is difficult—a persistent challenge in China's SaaS industry.

AI was once seen as a promising second growth engine for office software. However, the scaling back of the ONE project proved one thing: AI only addresses functional layers, not delivery layers.

The decision-making logic for B2B clients has never changed—whether a solution can solve practical problems and deliver a clear return on investment (ROI). Clients will not pay extra for "chat and document writing" capabilities; they want AI to help them reduce headcount, improve efficiency, and cut costs. Piling on a few large language model features without creating deliverable industry solutions means even the most impressive demos are just performances.

These are issues that cannot be resolved through product capabilities alone. They require channel strength, delivery capabilities, industry expertise, and the ability to handle responsibilities when faults occur or spare parts run out.

These are not things that can be explained in a product launch, nor can they be decided by an assertive product founder.

Bringing in a younger CEO, adjusting the organizational structure, and integrating the sales system essentially represent the group's effort to regain control and fully incorporate DingTalk into Alibaba's overall digital ecosystem. While the founder has relinquished power, none of DingTalk's problems have been resolved.

【People Exit, but Problems Remain】

The clues from the two relinquishments of power and the two barriers are clear enough.

Based on the above, I offer three conclusions:

First, do not interpret this appointment as either a layoff or a promotion. It is merely a smooth transition, a common soft-landing path for veterans in major corporations. The real signal lies in the sequence: first, send someone to handle business operations, then someone to define strategy. As for whether there was any behind-the-scenes influence, the announcement provides no answers—we can only speculate.

Second, DingTalk's future success hinges not on product innovation but on delivery capabilities. Whoever can first create a vertically integrated workspace that is deliverable, billable, and replicable will be the first to unlock monetization opportunities. General-purpose capabilities will become increasingly commoditized, while industry-specific know-how will grow more valuable.

Third, humanoid robots and office AI are essentially two versions of the same story. Both generate excitement during the demo phase but struggle to deliver value in real-world workspaces. The only difference is that one is still searching for a scenario, while the other has found one but has yet to establish a viable delivery model.

【Conclusion】

Chen Hang's alias, Wu Zhao, comes from the phrase "No Sword, Yet Supreme Swordsmanship." For the first decade of DingTalk's existence, he relied on exceptional product judgment to carve out a path amidst giants, embodying the archetype of a product hero.

However, major corporations have no permanent product heroes—only permanent strategic turning points. His two relinquishments of DingTalk, one at the "Cloud-DingTalk Integration" and the other during the AI transformation, occurred five years apart but at strikingly similar junctures.

The annual salary of 100,000 yuan is insignificant. What matters is that when someone with twenty years of product experience can only leverage their experience and network, who bears the cost of this devaluation—him or the system that no longer nurtures product heroes?

Note: Some data in this article is sourced from publicly available information online.