In September 2026, GoPro, the trailblazer in action cameras, was acquired by an optical communications company for a mere $285 million—a stark drop from its peak market value of $13 billion.

At its zenith, GoPro boasted a remarkable track record: revenue doubling annually, a market value surpassing $10 billion, and its founder, Nick Woodman, being hailed as the "next Steve Jobs of hardware." Yet, it ultimately failed to emulate Apple's dominance in the imaging world and instead met a fate similar to Nokia's decline.

GoPro's journey offers an insightful case study for understanding today's imaging market: while a company's short-term earnings are driven by cost management, its long-term value hinges on its positioning in the evolving market landscape.

01 GoPro's Warning

In 2002, avid surfer Nick Woodman, using rubber bands to attach a camera to his wrist, captured his surfing moments, planting the earliest seeds for GoPro. Twelve years later, in 2014, GoPro made its debut on NASDAQ. By 2015, its revenue had soared to $1.62 billion, nearly monopolizing the global action camera market.

However, the descent was as rapid as the ascent. In the same quarter that revenue peaked, GoPro reported its first quarterly loss. In 2016, it ventured into drones with the Karma, but all units were recalled within 16 days due to battery failures, and the product was discontinued within two years.

The Karma's failure was merely a symptom of a deeper issue: GoPro's ecosystem. Despite Woodman's public declaration that "We are a content production company," GoPro failed to develop even a basic companion app. Users frequently complained about the GoPro editing software, Quik, citing crashes, lag, and an inability to render long clips. The official workaround was to shorten clips before importing, as longer videos would crash the software. By 2024, GoPro had discontinued the desktop version of Quik, outsourcing desktop editing to third parties.

Meanwhile, its flagship Hero series languished in incremental updates. The sensor remained unchanged since 2021, plagued by persistent issues like overheating and short battery life. Innovation stalled, and loyal users gradually drifted away.

In 2022, GoPro still held an 84% share of the global action camera market, but by the first three quarters of 2025, its share had plummeted to 18%, while DJI claimed the top spot with 66%. In 2025, GoPro's annual revenue fell to $652 million, down nearly 20% year-on-year. Its stock price crashed from a high of $93 to under $2. Between 2023 and 2025, it accumulated losses of approximately $579 million (about RMB 3.9 billion), culminating in its sale in 2026. The buyer was interested not in GoPro's camera business but in its portfolio of over 2,500 U.S. patents.

Thus, a category pioneer was left behind by the era it created, all because it failed to invest for the long term when short-term metrics looked best.

02 Two Paths: Diversification and Redefinition

As users increasingly complained about GoPro's usability issues, two Chinese companies—Insta360 and DJI—quietly seized market share. By the time GoPro realized what had happened, the "three-way battle" had become a "two-way duel."

DJI leveraged its drone technology to enter the action and gimbal camera markets, topping the action camera segment. Insta360 started with 360-degree cameras and dominated the global 360-degree camera rankings. These two Shenzhen-based companies, located less than 10 kilometers apart, redefined imaging tools from different directions.

DJI followed a path of "leveraging core technologies to expand into adjacent categories." The Pocket series brought drone gimbal technology to ground-level shooting, selling over 10 million units in a single generation. From drones to action cameras, 360-degree cameras, and even robotic vacuums, DJI consistently migrated proven technical capabilities into new product forms. Its competitive edge lies in hardware technologies like flight control, obstacle avoidance, and navigation, honed over a decade of engineering expertise and flight data.

Insta360 took a different route. Its core technology revolves around 360-degree imaging: stitching, stabilization, AI-driven image processing, computational photography, and three custom-designed chips. Nearly 60% of its employees are R&D personnel.

But more critical than technology is its product definition capability.

360-degree cameras themselves represent a mass market carved out by Insta360. Before, action cameras relied on "predictive shooting"—users had to decide framing, angle, and composition in advance, with little room for correction. Insta360 introduced 360-degree capture and post-shooting reconstruction, transforming shooting into "record first, create later": the camera captures everything, and users refine the footage afterward. No need for repeated angle adjustments or fear of missing moments.

From product definition, Insta360 reshaped how users "shoot" and "use" cameras. Take the Invisible Selfie Stick, which uses 360-degree algorithms to remove the stick from the frame, creating the illusion of drone-like tracking shots. Or the Snap selfie screen, a magnetic attachment for real-time preview during rear-camera selfies, solving the blind-shooting pain point for smartphone users. This is product definition: not just making something better, but making it different.

Currently, both companies are shifting their competitive advantages from hardware to software and ecosystems. After all, hardware leads last only six months; once competitors catch up, parameter gaps quickly close. Software and ecosystem barriers are compound and harder to replicate.

DJI is developing custom 3D-stacked AI chips for on-device inference, moving AI computing power from the cloud to the device itself. Insta360 is focusing on the cloud, co-developing the "Moment Pro" feature with Amazon Web Services. Users input a prompt like, "I want a video of me with my kids," and the system automatically retrieves footage, identifies highlights, arranges music, and generates a finished video. Both companies are deepening the relationship between users and devices across dimensions: shoot, then edit; edit, then shoot again. The more users engage, the higher the switching costs.

Meanwhile, both are expanding into new markets. DJI is venturing into 360-degree cameras and robotic vacuums; Insta360 is exploring gimbal cameras, drones, and photography robots.

03 Final Outcome: Irreplaceable in Their Own Domains

In recent years, Insta360 and DJI have clashed head-on across multiple fronts—360-degree cameras, action cameras, gimbal cameras, drones—from product benchmarking to price wars. What will the imaging market's final landscape look like? A duopoly?

Perhaps not.

Traditional duopolies, like Coca-Cola and Pepsi, divide the same market. They compete for the same demand: consumers want cola, and every bottle of yours sold means one fewer of theirs. It's a zero-sum game. DJI and Insta360 differ in that they initially targeted entirely different markets. DJI's core demand is "flight": building technologies around aerial scenarios. Insta360's core demand is "capture": building technologies around the full content creation workflow.

While their product portfolios overlap in categories like action and gimbal cameras, overlap ≠ homogenization. DJI approaches 360-degree cameras with a drone-derived mindset; Insta360 approaches drones with an imaging-algorithm mindset. Their underlying tech DNA, user perceptions, and ecosystem lock-ins differ. This is why neither can displace the other's core strengths. DJI's flight control system relies on decades of flight data and safety validation; Insta360's creative ecosystem depends on a deep understanding of every step from shooting to sharing.

Thus, the more likely final outcome is that DJI and Insta360 become irreplaceable in their respective domains, sustaining a dynamic market with ongoing competition in overlapping categories.

The competition remains unresolved. Whoever strengthens their barriers will secure their position when the final outcome arrives. In this context, sustained R&D investment is precisely what companies need.

In the first half of 2026, Insta360's R&D spending exceeded RMB 1 billion, accounting for 18.78% of revenue. It strategically stockpiled chips worth nearly RMB 2 billion and invested RMB 762 million in new categories, equivalent to 80% of its net profit for the same period. These figures may look unappealing on profit statements, but from a long-term perspective, they represent necessary bets to secure a position a decade from now.

GoPro also invested: acquiring editing apps, developing custom chips, launching subscription services. But its investments failed to build barriers—the acquired editing software remained poorly performing, the custom chips didn't turn the tide, and subscription revenue couldn't offset hardware declines. Insta360's investments consistently focused on imaging algorithms and creative ecosystems, while DJI's focused on flight control and hardware performance. Both companies kept stacking layers onto their core barriers—that's the difference between "strategic bets" and "money-burning."

Epilogue

In industries where the final outcome remains undetermined, underinvestment is the greatest risk. GoPro failed to bolster its software ecosystem or develop a second growth engine when it was most profitable. By the time short-term metrics deteriorated, it was too late.

Today, Insta360 and DJI's expansions into new categories and ecosystem-building are not about quarterly profits. DJI's move from drones to handheld devices and Insta360's shift from 360-degree cameras to drones and photography robots are both about securing long-term positions. The market may question a company's pace, but rarely the industry's direction.