Douyin has become an indispensable app for everyone

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Recently, a monthly research report released by Nomura Securities caused quite a stir in the internet circle. Citing data from QuestMobile, the report showed that in July 2026, Douyin's total monthly usage time surpassed WeChat's for the first time, claiming the top spot as the single app with the highest usage time among Chinese users, with a 19.4% share, while WeChat followed with 18.8%.

If we only look at the scale of daily active users, WeChat still holds a significant lead: 931 million versus 714 million, a gap of over 200 million. In terms of penetration rate, WeChat covers 90.2% of mobile internet users, while Douyin covers 80.6%.

However, the more noteworthy aspect is the difference in growth rates: Douyin's DAU increased by 19% year-on-year, while WeChat's grew by only 3%. More critically, the average daily usage time per active user on Douyin is approximately 112 to 120 minutes, whereas WeChat users spend about 82 to 85 minutes.

The gap in user scale is narrowing, while the gap in time spent per user has reversed.

For advertisers, this is a signal to recalibrate their advertising strategies.

User time is one of the core reference indicators for allocating advertising budgets. When five ByteDance apps (Douyin, Douyin Lite, Hongguo Short Drama, Toutiao, and Tomato Free Novels) collectively account for 40.9% of the time spent on China's top 50 apps, far surpassing Tencent's 29.1%, the attention landscape in the business world has undergone a structural shift.

However, what I want to discuss is not a binary narrative of 'who won and who lost.' What truly deserves analysis is the deeper logic behind this shift in user time.

It reveals the underlying differences in logic between two eras of the Chinese internet: the 'default open' logic of social relationship chains is being eroded by the 'proactive retention' logic of interest-based recommendations.

WeChat's Logic and Its Limits

To understand why Douyin can surpass WeChat, we must first understand what WeChat's growth model relies on.

WeChat is essentially a social network. Its moat does not lie in content itself but in the fact that 'everyone you know is on it.'

This gives WeChat the strongest user retention capability in the Chinese internet. At least for now, no one would easily [casually] delete WeChat, as doing so would mean disappearing from social relationships.

This relationship chain lock-in effect has been WeChat's strongest barrier over the past decade.

However, relationship chain lock-in also implies a singular growth logic. Nomura's analysis is insightful: WeChat's growth relies almost entirely on the natural expansion of its user base, with no improvement in user engagement itself.

WeChat's user growth primarily comes from the overall increase in mobile internet penetration in China and the online participation of elderly users, rather than from 'each user using it more.'

Has WeChat attempted to change? Of course. Videos on WeChat represent its most significant counterattack in the era of content consumption.

According to a research report by Sinolink Securities in August 2026, Videos on WeChat's DAU has reached 600 million, with average daily usage time exceeding 50 minutes. In Q2 2026, the total user time spent on Videos on WeChat increased by over 20% year-on-year.

These numbers are impressive. However, the growth logic of Videos on WeChat remains embedded within WeChat's social ecosystem. It relies on sharing and propagation through WeChat's relationship chains to gain traffic, rather than creating user demand through an independent recommendation engine.

This determines the ceiling for Videos on WeChat: it can become an excellent content platform, but its growth will always be limited by the inertia of user behavior within the WeChat ecosystem.

A user's 'default mindset' when opening WeChat is to chat, check messages, and handle tasks. Watching videos on WeChat is an 'additional action,' not the 'main task.'

This is the true dilemma WeChat faces: its core competitiveness [competitive edge], the social relationship chain, precisely limits its imagination in the content consumption space.

How Douyin Became a 'Time Black Hole'

Unlike WeChat, Douyin was never a 'tool' from day one but a 'content consumption engine.'

Its growth does not rely on users' social relationships but on the algorithm's continuous satisfaction and expansion of user interests.

A frequently overlooked fact is that the increase in Douyin's user time comes not only from 'more people using it' but also from 'each user using it longer.'

Nomura's data shows that Douyin's total monthly usage time in July increased by 29% year-on-year, driven by a 19% increase in DAU and an 8% increase in average daily usage time per user.

In contrast, WeChat's total monthly usage time grew by only 3%, almost entirely from a slight increase in DAU.

The core capability behind this is the continuous evolution of Douyin's recommendation algorithm. Early on, Douyin's recommendation logic was relatively simple, focusing on shallow interaction metrics like watch-through rate, like rate, and comment rate.

However, in the past two years, the weights in Douyin's recommendation algorithm have undergone significant adjustments, with the platform placing much greater emphasis on 'playback duration' and 'long-term proactive user interactions' (such as follows, comments, and saves).

This means the algorithm no longer just aims to 'make you watch one more video' but to 'establish a longer-term content consumption relationship with you on the platform.'

From a behavioral design perspective, Douyin's high-frequency usage is itself a habit-forming process.

The recommendation algorithm builds a neural pathway in the brain—'opening Douyin = getting satisfaction'—by continuously providing users with immediate, precise, and unexpected content stimuli.

In contrast, WeChat usage is more 'task-driven,' meaning users open it to reply to messages, check group chats, or handle work, then close it afterward.

Tasks can be completed, but the desire for content consumption is difficult to 'complete'; it is only renewed by new stimuli.

This may be the most critical perspective for understanding Douyin's surpassing of WeChat: WeChat consumes users' 'necessary time,' while Douyin consumes users' 'surplus time,' the latter being far larger in volume and virtually unlimited.

Hongguo Short Drama: ByteDance's Second Growth Pole in the 'Time Matrix'

While Douyin's rise was gradual, Hongguo Short Drama's explosion was a 'blitzkrieg.'

Launched in August 2023, it surpassed 100 million DAU in January 2026 and soared to 168 million DAU by July 2026, a 107% year-on-year increase.

Under the same monitoring metrics, Tencent Video had about 50 million DAU, iQiyi about 45 million, Youku and Mango TV about 30 million each, totaling around 155 million. Hongguo alone surpassed the combined DAU of these four platforms.

More stunning is the comparison in growth timelines: Hongguo achieved in three years what long-form video platforms took over a decade to accomplish in user accumulation.

Meanwhile, the monthly usage time of these four long-form video platforms declined by 24% to 47% year-on-year.

Why did Hongguo grow so fast? The answer lies in understanding ByteDance's ecosystem capabilities.

Hongguo's growth relies heavily on ByteDance's traffic closed loop [loopback]. Data shows that over half of Hongguo's new users come from Douyin referrals. Users discover short drama clips on Douyin and instantly jump to Hongguo to watch the full episodes. Tomato Free Novels supplies IP, Douyin provides traffic entry points, and Hongguo serves as the viewing container, forming a closed loop within the same group.

Notice the sophistication of this loop: it is not merely 'traffic referral' but a highly coupled integration of content production, distribution, and consumption.

Tomato Free Novels provides the story resources as the IP source, Douyin offers precise traffic distribution and user reach, and Hongguo delivers an immersive viewing experience.

This 'IP—traffic—consumption' integrated structure allows Hongguo to acquire users at a much lower cost than independent platforms and to supply content far more agilely than traditional long-form video platforms.

However, the most fundamental difference lies in the business model. Hongguo adopts a 'free viewing + ad revenue sharing' model, allowing users to watch all content without payment.

This model bypasses the paywall issue that plagues long-form video platforms. When users face the decision of 'pay to watch,' conversion rates are inherently limited; whereas the 'free to watch, advertisers pay' model reduces user decision costs to zero.

In the attention economy, lowering user decision costs is itself a significant competitive advantage.

More deeply, Hongguo's success reflects a structural shift in user content consumption habits.

In February 2026, Hongguo's average daily usage time per user reached 125 minutes. This data indicates that users are massively shifting the time they once allocated to long-form videos to shorter, more fragmented, higher-frequency, and more immediate content formats like short dramas.

This is not a replacement of one platform by another but a paradigm shift in content consumption.

ByteDance's Success Logic

If we only look at Douyin and Hongguo, one might think it's just 'good luck' or 'catching a trend.'

However, when we zoom out to see ByteDance's overall business landscape, we see that this is more like a replicable capability system continuously delivering results.

In 2026, ByteDance's CEO clarified the company's core business strategy at the mid-year all-hands meeting: 'high priority, thick trunk, optimize for the long term,' with core businesses comprising three segments: AI, information platforms, and transaction services.

These three segments are not isolated but tightly coupled and mutually reinforcing.

Information platforms are ByteDance's foundation. The content matrix of Douyin, Toutiao, Tomato Free Novels, and Hongguo Short Drama is essentially a replication of the same 'recommendation engine + content ecosystem' capability across different content categories.

Understanding this allows us to see why Hongguo Short Drama could quickly replicate Douyin's success path—because the underlying capabilities are shared.

Transaction services are ByteDance's commercialization engine. During the 2026 618 shopping festival, over 120,000 merchants on Douyin E-commerce saw their live-stream transaction volumes double year-on-year, with small and medium-sized influencers contributing over 80% of influencer-driven sales.

Douyin Local Services exceeded 850 billion yuan in annual payment GMV in 2025, with a 2026 growth target of around 50%. These numbers show that ByteDance is not just 'capturing user time' but efficiently converting it into commercial transactions.

From an advertising revenue perspective, Douyin generates about 1.1 billion yuan in daily ad revenue, compared to Tencent's 600 million yuan and Kuaishou's 220 million yuan over the same period.

In the first half of 2026, among the top 10 players in China's internet advertising market, Douyin ranked second with an 18.7% share, just behind Taobao's 22.8%.

Meanwhile, AI is becoming ByteDance's most critical variable for the next decade. Doubao leads the domestic AI chatbot market with 168 million DAU, while its video generation model, Seedance, maintains industry-leading performance.

In late July 2026, ByteDance initiated a major organizational restructuring focused on AI: the Feishu product team was merged into Doubao, the Feishu GTM team was integrated with Volcano Engine, and a new ToB organization, the 'Creativity Service Platform,' was established.

The essence of this restructuring is to connect the entire chain of 'AI capabilities—product entry points—commercialization delivery,' transforming Doubao, Feishu, and Volcano Engine from isolated businesses into an integrated AI system for enterprise productivity scenarios.

Also noteworthy is TikTok. In Q1 2026, TikTok's global monthly active users surpassed 2 billion for the first time.

This means ByteDance has established a 2-billion-user platform overseas, just like Douyin in China.

The dual-engine structure of domestic Douyin and overseas TikTok gives ByteDance a scale advantage in the global attention market that no other Chinese internet company has ever achieved.

To understand why ByteDance is so successful, one must recognize its internal synergies.

First is the cross-category replication of algorithm capabilities. ByteDance is essentially a 'recommendation engine company.' Its core asset is not a specific app but a recommendation algorithm adaptable to different content formats.

When applied to short videos, it became Douyin; to free reading, Tomato Free Novels; to short dramas, Hongguo.

Each new category entry leverages the recommendation algorithm's cold-start efficiency and content-matching precision, far surpassing competitors starting from scratch. This is the most fundamental capability difference between ByteDance and traditional internet companies.

Second is the systemic efficiency of traffic closed loop [loopback]. ByteDance's products are not isolated but form an ecosystem of mutual referral and reinforcement.

Tomato Free Novels supplies IP for Hongguo, Douyin provides traffic for Hongguo, and Hongguo's user data feeds back into the recommendation algorithm.

This systemic internal traffic Cycle allows each new ByteDance product to acquire initial users at a much lower cost than the market average and to scale rapidly.

Finally is the agility in business model iteration. From information feed ads to live-stream e-commerce, from local services to free short dramas, ByteDance consistently demonstrates the ability to switch and combine different commercialization paths rapidly.

Hongguo's 'free + ad revenue-sharing' model is a typical example. Instead of copying the subscription model of long-form video platforms, it leverages ByteDance's mature capabilities in ad monetization to create a business model better suited to short-form drama content.

ByteDance's core strategy for the first half of 2026—'high priority, streamlined core, optimize for the long term'—is an institutionalized expression of this agility.

Of course, all growth has its limits.

While Douyin has surpassed WeChat in terms of user time spent, there remains a gap of over 200 million in daily active users. WeChat's 1.439 billion combined monthly active accounts still represent the largest user base in China's internet landscape.

Moreover, WeChat's growth, while slow, is extremely stable. A 3% DAU growth rate on a base of 931 million represents a significant absolute increase.

ByteDance itself also faces multiple challenges. The growth of Fanqie Free Novels has shown signs of slowing, with DAU up just 6% year-on-year in July, down from 8% in June.

Doubao, despite its 168 million DAU, has seen its month-on-month growth rate drop to zero, as competition in the chatbot sector shifts toward office scenarios with stronger commercial closed loop s.

In large language models, ByteDance has acknowledged a gap with leading overseas models, requiring the company to 'accept short-term lag while persisting in long-term optimization.'

Overseas, TikTok continues to face geopolitical uncertainties, which to some extent influence the company's AI technology roadmap.

More importantly, with ByteDance apps collectively accounting for 40.9% of Chinese internet users' time, regulatory scrutiny over 'attention monopoly' is rising.

The societal impact of algorithmic recommendations, content ecosystem diversity, and the boundaries of platform responsibility—these issues will not disappear with growth but will become more urgent as scale expands.

Viewed together, Douyin surpassing WeChat and Hongguo surpassing iQIYI, Youku, Tencent Video, and Mango TV point to a broader narrative:

In the second half of the mobile internet era, the commercial value of 'relationship chains' is being diluted by 'interest chains.'

WeChat represents the golden rule of the previous era: whoever controls human connections controls the internet.

Douyin and ByteDance's ecosystem represent the new rule of this era: whoever can use algorithms to consistently create 'flow experiences' for users will control users' 'time sovereignty.'

This shift is far from over. It has only just begun.