Losing exclusive favor can often unveil new opportunities.

Handcrafted by Shoumei / Produced by Jueshu / Observed by Unicorn

On March 13, Thalys Group released a delayed production and sales report for February, revealing startling data: total vehicle sales for the month stood at 21,329 units, marking a year-on-year drop of 39.43%. Sales of the core Thalys Automobile (AITO series) amounted to 15,007 units, a decrease of 46.52% from the previous year, nearly halving.

This emerging player, whose share price soared more than tenfold due to Huawei's influence and whose net profit first exceeded 5.5 billion yuan in 2024, appears to be slipping from the pedestal of the "Huawei Miracle".

From the debut of the AITO M5 to the AITO M9 topping the sales chart for luxury cars priced above 500,000 yuan in 2024, Thalys was once hailed as a model for traditional automakers' transition to intelligence.

However, as Huawei's HarmonyOS Smart Ecosystem expands beyond the "sole child" AITO to encompass the "four realms" (Wisdom Realm, Enjoyment Realm, Honor Realm), and as the market shifts from technological frenzy to cost competition, Thalys' competitive edge is facing unprecedented challenges.

Entering 2025, is Thalys' sudden sales slowdown an inevitable consequence of Huawei's waning influence, or a microcosm of the restructuring within China's smart electric vehicle industry?

01 Stalling

As early as the beginning of 2023, industry rumors circulated that Kuaishou was formally entering the credit field. By the end of 2023, Kuaishou further pursued its financial ambitions by continuously recruiting talent, including positions in risk control compliance, supply chain finance, and other areas.

On March 13, Thalys' February production and sales data sent shockwaves, shattering the capital market's optimistic expectations for its "Huawei concept stock".

The data revealed that Thalys' new energy vehicle sales plummeted 41.04% year-on-year to 17,800 units, with Thalys brand car sales falling 46.52% to 15,000 units. The sole bright spot was that AITO M9 still maintained a year-on-year growth rate of 243.89%.

More concerningly, the cumulative sales decline for January-February this year expanded to 42.88%, forming a stark contrast with the 79.7% industry growth rate for the new energy market in February, as announced by the China Passenger Car Association.

On January 21, Thalys issued a performance forecast stating that it expects to achieve a net profit attributable to shareholders of listed companies of between 5.5 billion and 6 billion yuan in 2024. Compared to the same period last year, it turned losses into profits, marking Thalys' first profit after joining forces with Huawei. The AITO New M7, a collaboration between the two, delivered a cumulative of 197,000 new vehicles in 2024, becoming the annual sales champion among new force models.

This stark contrast has propelled Thalys to the forefront: is the "star automaker" that once reversed its fortune with Huawei's glow now descending from the clouds?

Looking back at Thalys' growth trajectory, Huawei's empowerment undoubtedly serves as the core driver of its rise.

In 2021, Thalys Group, then still known as Xiaokang Automobile, made a strategically insightful move: it "joined hands" with Huawei, which was grappling with supply chain issues in its phone business and preparing to expand into the electric vehicle market. For a long time, Thalys was Huawei's "sole favorite".

In August 2024, Thalys invested 11.5 billion yuan in Huawei Yingwang Intelligence and became its first batch of strategic partners. The collaboration between the two parties escalated from technology licensing to a deep "business + equity" binding. As their cooperation deepened, Thalys' share price soared, with its market value once exceeding 200 billion yuan, making it a hot "Huawei-affiliated" automaker in the capital market.

In June 2025, Thalys' monthly sales exceeded 44,000 units, a year-on-year increase of 372%, with AITO M9 sales reaching 42,800 units in a single month, setting a new record high.

Entering 2025, while the overall market continued to grow rapidly, Thalys' sales stalled. Is Huawei's glow no longer effective?

02 Immediate Concerns

Thalys' slowdown is less an accident and more an inevitable outcome of multiple converging factors.

Facing the year's opening results, Zhang Xinghai, Chairman of Thalys Group, remained relatively calm. He said in an interview with China Entrepreneur: "This is a very normal phenomenon. Cyclical fluctuations are within controlled limits. It's like the sun rising and setting."

Examining Thalys' product launch schedule provides some support for this statement.

Starting from late March, Thalys' AITO M9 2025, AITO New M5 Ultra, and AITO M8 will be unveiled successively. Consumers' wait-and-see attitude towards upcoming new products will inevitably lead to a diversion of demand for existing models.

For instance, within a week of the pre-sale launch of AITO M8, orders exceeded 58,000 units, and orders for the M9 2025 surpassed 30,000 units. However, the pre-sale phase also suppressed sales of currently available models. Additionally, production line resources are inclined towards new models (such as preparations for mass production of the M9 2025), leading to limited production capacity for on-sale models and exacerbating the contradiction between supply and demand.

Furthermore, Thalys faces structural challenges, with a strong performance in the high-end market but an imbalanced proportion. AITO M9 is thriving in the luxury car market above 500,000 yuan, but its sales account for a relatively low proportion. The low-end market, on the other hand, is rapidly evolving, with price reductions for models like Tesla Model Y and adjustments to system-wide benefits by brands like NIO, indirectly leading to sluggish sales of AITO M5 and M7.

Especially M7 has seen a significant decline. AITO M7 sold 5,558 units in January 2025, a year-on-year decrease of 81.47%; sales in February were 5,204 units, a year-on-year decrease of 75.32%.

When facing the media, Zhang Xinghai repeatedly emphasized the importance of "firmly pursuing cross-border cooperation".

For Thalys, Huawei HarmonyOS Intelligence is the "one and only," but for Huawei, as the HarmonyOS Smart Ecosystem accelerates its expansion, AITO has transitioned from being the "sole child" to one of the "four children," and may become one of the "N children" in the future.

Short-term market fluctuations may not be alarming, but in the long run, Thalys' biggest hidden danger lies in the challenges posed by the dilution of cooperation dividends with Huawei.

03 Long-term Worries

Since collaborating with Huawei to launch the AITO brand in 2021, Thalys has leveraged the exclusive benefits of "Huawei technology + channels" to leap from a struggling edge automaker to the sales champion of new forces.

However, with the expansion of Huawei's HarmonyOS Smart Ecosystem, Thalys' "favorite" status quickly crumbled.

Huawei has successively partnered with automakers such as Chery, BAIC, and JAC to introduce brands like Wisdom Realm, Enjoyment Realm, and Honor Realm, forming a "four realms" pattern. AITO has transitioned from being Huawei's "sole child" to one of the "four children," with its priority in technology first-launch rights, marketing resources, and offline channels being diluted.

For example, the first-launch right of Huawei HarmonyOS Cabin 4.0 was secured by Avitar, and Yu Chengdong's focus for Spring Festival marketing shifted to Enjoyment Realm S9 and Wisdom Realm R7, even going as far as publicly live-streaming driving the Enjoyment Realm model. These actions send a clear signal: Huawei's traffic is accelerating its diversion. Moreover, the Wisdom Realm R7 has a high degree of overlap with the AITO M7 in positioning, with nearly 80% overlap in price range, directly sparking internal competition within the "Huawei-affiliated" group.

The openness of Huawei's ecosystem is an inevitable choice for its strategy of "helping automakers build good cars," but for Thalys, this means that the three moats it relies on for survival—technology exclusivity, brand premium, and channel advantage—are on the brink of depletion.

Relying on a deeply integrated cooperation model with Huawei allowed Thalys to rise rapidly but also laid down structural hidden dangers. At the technical level, Thalys' core three-electric system and intelligent driving solutions are highly dependent on Huawei, with weak independent research and development capabilities. The AITO M5 has undergone only minor facelifts since its launch in 2022, while competitor Xiaopeng G6 has iterated three times during the same period, resulting in a lagging product update rhythm. This is one of the reasons for M5's sluggish sales.

At the brand level, consumer perception remains at the stage of "Huawei OEM factory," lacking user stickiness and independent brand value. A survey of AITO M9 owners revealed that "Huawei cooperation" accounted for over 70% of purchasing decisions, while Thalys' own brand influence is nearly negligible.

This dependency is particularly evident in the sales structure: AITO M9 supports brand visibility with its high-end positioning above 500,000 yuan, but its sales accounted for only 41% in January-February, while sales of mass market models M5 and M7 have continued to lag, leading to an overall growth slowdown. Thalys has attempted to expand into the low-to-mid-end market through the Blue Electricity brand, but this brand only sells a few thousand vehicles per month, and its core technology still relies on BYD and Huawei, failing to establish differentiated competitiveness.

Facing such "long-term worries," Thalys has initiated an autonomization strategy, but its success remains questionable.

In the short term, Thalys is betting on AITO M8 to fill the market gap of 300,000-450,000 yuan, with an expected annual sales volume of 180,000 units. However, this price range is fiercely competitive, with models like Lixiang L9 and Zeekr 001 keeping a close eye on it. M8 needs to establish absolute advantages in intelligent driving (Huawei ADS 3.0) and cost-effectiveness. The medium-to-long-term layout focuses on technological autonomization: Thalys plans to invest 5 billion yuan in researching and developing an 800V high-voltage platform and solid-state batteries, aiming to increase the self-sufficiency rate of core technologies from 30% to 70% within three years.

However, technological breakthroughs take time, and the window of opportunity left for Thalys in the market is narrowing. Although its secondary listing plan in Hong Kong can alleviate financial pressure (with a target fundraising of over 1 billion US dollars), if it fails to reverse its "Huawei dependence," the patience of the capital market may not last long. A deeper challenge lies in brand reshaping: how to enhance independent recognition through user community operations and after-sales service innovations (such as a points system and offline activities) will determine whether Thalys can shed the "OEM factory" label.

Thalys' dilemma reflects the transformation of the new energy vehicle industry from "riding the wave of momentum" to "hardcore competition." While the openness of Huawei's ecosystem provides automakers with a technological springboard, excessive dependence on partners may lead to the atrophy of autonomous capabilities. When technological dividends fade, only enterprises that master core research and development and establish brand moats can survive.

For Thalys, losing "exclusive favor" may be an opportunity for rebirth. If it can make breakthroughs in M8 delivery, technology research and development, and brand operation, it may be able to step out of Huawei's shadow; if it continues to be trapped in a "parasitic" model, it may become a discarded pawn in Huawei's ecosystem expansion. In the final round of the new energy vehicle competition, there are no permanent "favorites," only eternal competitiveness. (End)