Sea, the E-commerce Giant, Made RMB 43 Billion in Three Months—Yet Its Stock Price Plunged 40%

11/18 2026 515

Image | Chart by Pencil Way

Sea, the parent company of Southeast Asian e-commerce giant Shopee, recently released its Q3 financial results.

Shopee's quarterly revenue reached US$6.07 billion (about RMB 43 billion), up 41.3% year on year; adjusted EBITDA came in at US$269 million (about RMB 1.9 billion), up 44.7% year on year.

Both revenue and profit hit record highs.

Yet on the day of the earnings release, the stock fell more than 10% in premarket trading at one point. Sea's share price has already dropped about 40% this year.

Why didn't the market buy into its most profitable quarter?

- 01 - Shopee Is Better at Making Money, but It Isn't Selling More Goods

In Q3, Shopee's GMV was US$39.7 billion, up 23.3% year on year; orders totaled 4.5 billion, up 25.5%. Revenue, however, rose 41.3%.

Transaction volume rose by two tenths, while revenue rose by four tenths—the platform is extracting more money from every transaction.

This shift did not happen overnight. Shopee was founded in 2015, and for its first seven years it did only one thing: build scale through subsidies, zero commissions, and free shipping. In 2022, Sea as a whole was loss-making, and its stock price fell from US$372 to the teens; investors were no longer willing to pay for GMV. In 2023, Shopee achieved full-year profitability for the first time—by cutting subsidies, raising commissions, and selling advertising.

Three years on, this path has been pursued down to very fine details. In Q3, Shopee's monetization rate (revenue as a share of GMV) continued to rise, and it relied not on a one-time commission increase but on splitting a single transaction into several charging points.

Breaking it down: core platform revenue—mainly transaction commissions and advertising—was US$4.6 billion, up 50.6% year on year, and accounted for all of the incremental growth. Meanwhile, revenue from logistics-related value-added services was US$724.4 million, compared with US$723.6 million in the same period last year—almost flat.

In other words, the extra money Shopee made this quarter did not come from selling more goods, but from selling traffic and selling memberships.

Advertising revenue grew more than 55% year on year; the number of sellers placing paid ads increased more than 35%, and the average ad spend of these sellers also rose about 13%; advertising revenue as a share of GMV increased by more than 0.8 percentage points year on year. When a merchant uploads a product, Shopee's AI advertising system automatically pushes it into traffic entry points such as search and recommendations—it sounds convenient, but every impression requires bidding.

Membership is the second piece. As of the end of September, Shopee VIP members exceeded 21 million, up more than 40% quarter on quarter, with a monthly retention rate of about 80%. This group contributed nearly 25% of the platform's GMV, and after subscribing, their average spending also rose by a double-digit percentage. Members can get shopping discounts of 4% to 6%. In September, Shopee also launched VIP+ in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, bundling membership benefits with Netflix subscriptions.

The third piece is content. In Q3, orders brought in by livestreaming and short videos grew more than 45% year on year, accounting for more than 25% of physical goods orders in Southeast Asia. Shopee also launched micro-dramas: watch dramas to earn points, and exchange points for shopping discounts—it wants to learn from TikTok and get users to open the app even when they have no shopping intent.

From taking a cut from selling goods to selling exposure, selling memberships, and selling content, Shopee has dug out the money behind a transaction layer by layer.

- 02 - The Platform Earns More, but Merchants Aren't Buying In

Advertising up 55% is good news for the platform. For merchants, however, it means higher costs.

A plan on the Philippine site is representative: after certain invited merchants join, the system automatically converts 2% of each confirmed order amount into advertising credits for subsequent promotion. Not all merchants are forced into it, but the direction is clear—the platform is tying advertising investment to sales and making ad spending part of daily operations.

But it cannot keep extracting money from merchants without limit. Regulators have already taken notice. At the end of October, Thailand's Ministry of Commerce announced that it would work with Shopee, TikTok Shop, and Lazada to lower platform fees for eligible local small and medium-sized merchants. The measure will take effect for six months from December 1; for some Shopee merchants, the maximum fee reduction will reach 33.3%, and about 1.2 million merchants qualify for support from the three major platforms.

With commissions capped, advertising becomes more important. This also explains why advertising revenue could rise 55%.

Merchants are also looking for a way out. Mao Congren, founder of Andersen Digital Supply Chain, told Pencil Way that the platform and a company's own customer acquisition system are not an either-or choice; it depends on product characteristics and customer procurement methods. For consumer goods with a high degree of standardization and fast decision-making, platforms like Shopee are still efficient, especially suitable for manufacturing companies to validate the market in the early stage; but for professional products such as machinery and equipment, industrial goods, and spare parts, where customer procurement cycles are long and repurchase value is high, he recommends independent websites, search engines, professional content, and customer management.

Mao Congren has a judgment: platforms solve transaction efficiency, while a company's own customer acquisition system builds long-term customer assets. In his view, platform traffic is essentially rented; the more commercialized the platform becomes, the more companies must watch customer acquisition costs and profit margins, and cannot hand their market fate entirely to the platform.

AI is changing the cost structure of this. In the past, developing overseas customers required a dedicated team to study markets, analyze keywords, create multilingual content, and find leads one by one; now product materials and technical parameters can be directly converted into multilingual, searchable digital content. But Mao Congren also warns that AI cannot replace product competitiveness, delivery capability, and business trust.

- 03 - Record Results, So Why Did the Stock Price Plunge 40%?

Shopee delivered its most profitable quarter in history, but the capital market threw a bucket of cold water on Sea.

As of before the earnings release on November 10, Sea's stock price had already fallen about 40% cumulatively this year. After the earnings release, the stock price remained under pressure.

From November 10 to 16, Sea's stock price fell from US$76.80 to US$71.63. Calculated from the closing price of US$77.96 on the trading day before the earnings release, the cumulative decline was about 8.1%.

What really unsettled the market was not merchant sentiment, but competition.

Southeast Asian e-commerce is still growing. A report released in October by Google, Temasek, and Bain estimates that Southeast Asia's e-commerce GMV will reach US$226 billion in 2026, up 18% year on year. The question is who gets the growth.

Cube data: in the first half of 2026, among the combined GMV of Shopee, TikTok Shop, and Lazada in six major Southeast Asian markets, Shopee accounted for 55%, TikTok Shop 39%, and Lazada only 6%. In 2023, these three figures were 61%, 17%, and 22%.

Shopee's absolute GMV is still rising—US$53.9 billion in the first half, up 24% year on year, about US$10.4 billion more than the same period last year. But its share is declining, and TikTok Shop's GMV in the first half grew 93% year on year.

By market, the picture is uneven. In the first half, Shopee's GMV in Indonesia was US$21.3 billion, accounting for 40% of the six countries' total, up 19% year on year; the Philippines was US$7.3 billion, up 40%; Thailand and Malaysia both grew 32%; Vietnam grew only 10%.

The two slowest-growing markets happen to be the two where TikTok Shop is most aggressive.

Thailand is even more striking. In the second quarter of 2026, TikTok Shop's share of physical goods GMV among Thailand's three major platforms reached 48%, surpassing Shopee's 45% for the first time, while Lazada fell to about 7%. A year earlier, the figures were Shopee 56% and TikTok Shop 30%. First-half GMV in Thailand: TikTok Shop US$9.9 billion, up 116% year on year; Shopee US$9.8 billion, up 32%; Lazada fell from US$2.1 billion to US$1.6 billion.

Vietnam may be next. Toni Ruotanen, head of Southeast Asia at marketing company Havas, estimates that at the current pace, TikTok Shop could surpass Shopee's share in Vietnam within the next six to nine months. This week, TikTok Shop officially launched a standalone app, first going live in four Southeast Asian countries—it is no longer just a feature inside the main TikTok app, but a shopping app that can compete head-on with Shopee for entry points.

Shopee's counterattack rests on three things: membership, content, and logistics. Membership and micro-dramas have already been mentioned above; for logistics, Brazil is the showcase. In Q3, the average waiting time for Brazilian consumers shortened by 12% year on year; about 40% of packages in the Sao Paulo region were delivered next day, and nearly 60% within two days; Shopee Turbo, relying on more than 7,000 partner stores, delivered some orders within 4 hours.

But costs surged: cost of revenue was US$3.5 billion, up 36.8% year on year; sales and marketing expenses were US$1.432 billion, up 60% year on year. Marketing expenses grew faster than revenue.

Singapore is still its territory. Momentum Works data shows that in 2025 Shopee accounted for 52% locally, Lazada 36%, and TikTok Shop only 6%. But Southeast Asia is not just Singapore.

This is why a record-breaking earnings report cannot bring a rising stock price. Shopee's ability to make money is getting stronger, but its moat is getting shallower—the monetization rate is going up, and its share is going down; these two curves will eventually collide.

Shopee spent ten years turning Southeast Asian e-commerce into a business with annual GMV of nearly US$100 billion. Next it has to prove something else: when traffic is no longer cheap, competitors are no longer behind, and merchants start doing the math, can this business keep raising prices?

This article does not constitute any investment advice.

Solemnly declare: the copyright of this article belongs to the original author. The reprinted article is only for the purpose of spreading more information. If the author's information is marked incorrectly, please contact us immediately to modify or delete it. Thank you.