“Orders exceeded 5,200 within the first 24 hours of launch.” After two years of collaboration between GAC Group and Huawei Qiankun, and with high-level endorsements from Feng Xingya’s two visits to Shenzhen for discussions with Ren Zhengfei, the Qijing GT7 initially generated a flurry of orders. However, this was followed by a sharp decline in sales—2,658 units in July, dropping to 1,100 units in August. This brand, touted as the "first realm of Huawei Qiankun," faced immediate challenges.

Bustling Orders, Lukewarm Market Response: GT7’s Launch Falls Flat

On September 23, Qijing’s second model, the GX7, officially launched with a limited-time starting price of 229,900 yuan, entering the competitive large five-seater SUV segment. The new car claimed to have received 15,318 orders within 18 hours of launch—another surge in initial orders. This came just three months after the brand’s first model hit the market, and behind this hasty follow-up was the underperformance of the brand’s debut product, the Qijing GT7.

The Qijing GT7, launched on June 26 this year and priced between 209,900 and 329,900 yuan, was the first mass-produced model jointly developed by GAC Group and Huawei Qiankun. It was also the world’s first model to natively feature Huawei Qiankun’s Intelligent Driving ADS 5. Officials previously claimed that the new car received over 5,200 orders within 24 hours of launch, with nationwide deliveries starting on July 9. However, after the initial excitement, sales dropped significantly.

According to GAC Group’s official production and sales report, Qijing sold 2,658 units in July and 1,100 units in August, marking a month-on-month decline exceeding 58%. Cumulative sales since launch stood at just 3,758 units. More notably, there was a significant gap between production and dealership delivery: In July, Qijing produced 4,147 units, with wholesale sales reaching 2,658 units, but only 772 units were insured—meaning over 70% of the first month’s wholesale volume remained in the distribution channel and did not reach actual users. By August, production had dropped to 1,591 units, further squeezing out the "moisture" (inflated figures) in channel inventory.

The issue begins with market segment selection. The Qijing GT7 targets the niche market of intelligent shooting brakes, a category with an extremely small share in China’s passenger vehicle market. Data shows that total shooting brake sales in China in 2025 will reach approximately 181,000 units, accounting for less than 1% of the passenger vehicle market. Leading models in this segment, such as the Zeekr 001, sold 1,580 units in August this year, while the NIO ET5-T sold around 1,600 units and the Xiangjie S9T less than 1,000 units—overall performance cannot be described as strong.

The contradiction of the shooting brake segment—“acclaimed but not selling”—also applies to the Qijing GT7.

Objectively, the Qijing GT7’s product strength is not weak: It integrates Huawei’s six major automotive intelligence solutions, comes standard with an 896-line LiDAR and closed dual-chamber air suspension, and its three-motor all-wheel-drive version accelerates from 0 to 100 km/h in 2.98 seconds. It also offers a lifetime warranty for the entire vehicle and its three electric systems. However, maxing out configurations did not translate into sales, indicating that in the 200,000–330,000 yuan price range, hardware stacking is no longer the decisive factor for success.

Previously, Qijing CEO Liu Jiaming stated at the Beijing Auto Show in April this year: “The younger generation’s understanding of cars has fundamentally changed; cars must be fun.” He judged that genuine demand for youthful and individualistic products is growing, and “Qijing will unwaveringly commit to the shooting brake market.” However, the results show that a niche design alone is hardly a sufficient condition for high volume.

Repeated Setbacks in the Premium Market: GAC’s Unfulfilled Aspirations

It should be noted that Qijing’s setback is not GAC Group’s first stumble in the premium market, nor is it the most severe.

During the internal combustion engine vehicle era, GAC Group attempted to move upward through Trumpchi's "Three 8s" strategy. In 2016, GAC Trumpchi launched three C-class models—the GA8, GS8, and GM8—simultaneously targeting the 200,000-yuan-plus market in sedans, SUVs, and MPVs. The GS8 once achieved monthly sales exceeding 10,000 units, briefly competing with the Toyota Highlander and Ford Edge as a "Big Three." However, sales ultimately collapsed due to product aging and transmission supply issues.

Entering the new energy era, GAC Group made three attempts to break into the premium market, but the first two were unsuccessful. At the end of 2019, GAC Aion (GAC New Energy) launched the AION LX, priced between 249,600 and 349,600 yuan after subsidies, attempting to elevate the brand in the pure electric segment. This was GAC’s first premium push in the new energy era, but the AION LX failed to achieve significant scale.

The second attempt was the Hyper brand, GAC’s most heavily invested and ultimately most embarrassing failure. In September 2022, GAC injected its pure electric exclusive platform and Xingling electronic and electrical architecture into this new brand. In 2025, GAC Group Chairman Feng Xingya explicitly stated, “Over the next three years, GAC Group will invest its top human, material, and financial resources into Hyper without limit, and Hyper will undoubtedly become a leading premium brand in China.”

However, results fell short of expectations. In 2024, Hyper’s retail sales reached just 17,000 units, failing to meet even half of its 50,000-unit target. By the end of 2025, Hyper was forced to merge with Aion into the Hyper Aion BU, ending its independent operation after less than a year. Returning to Aion’s fold did not bring a turnaround for the Hyper brand, with sales reaching just 4,564 units in the first eight months of 2026.

This was despite Hyper launching the new S600 model this year. As a last-ditch effort, the Hyper S600 has sold just over 1,200 units since its June launch, failing to gain traction. Within three years, Hyper underwent two strategic overhauls—from an Aion sub-brand to independent operation and back to merging with Aion BU. Amid this strategic back-and-forth, the battered Hyper brand could no longer shoulder GAC Group’s premium aspirations.

After Hyper’s failure, the third attempt is Qijing.

For the Qijing brand, GAC Group changed its approach: Instead of going it alone, it deeply aligned with Huawei. Around 800 members of Huawei Qiankun’s team are stationed long-term in Guangzhou for joint operations, with GAC Group leading manufacturing, quality control, and channels, while Huawei contributes intelligent driving, cockpit, and chassis technologies. Both sides jointly define and decide. With Hyper having become a “lost cause,” Feng Xingya has prioritized Qijing as a critical piece in “reinventing a new GAC.”

However, premium branding is never about a single model or a single technological label.

At the brand level, GAC Group’s repeated premium failures have created a brand stigma, and once perceptions solidify, they are hard to reverse with mere “Huawei content.” At the channel level, the new brand’s network and after-sales are still ramping up, struggling to meet the experience expectations of 300,000-yuan-plus users. At the user level, in the 200,000–300,000 yuan price range, consumers have abundant choices. Huawei technology may draw attention but does not necessarily translate into brand loyalty.

These are issues a single GT7 cannot resolve, and they lie at the heart of GAC Group’s repeated premium failures.

Intensifying Losses: Qijing’s Unavoidable Challenge

The urgency behind GAC Group’s push for Qijing to tackle the premium market lies in the group’s current operating performance. Objectively, even with Qijing’s initial setback, GAC Group is not without growth. In the first eight months of this year, GAC Group sold a cumulative 1.01 million vehicles, up 0.21% year-on-year. Among its independent brands, GAC Aion and GAC Trumpchi both saw year-on-year sales growth, with the group’s cumulative new energy vehicle sales reaching 368,000 units, up 63% year-on-year.

However, the quality of this growth requires closer scrutiny. One set of data highlights the pressure: GAC Honda sold 12,080 units in August, down 40.83% year-on-year, with a cumulative decline of 51.81% in the first eight months. Additionally, GAC Toyota, a rare bright spot among joint ventures, also entered a downward trajectory, selling 455,000 units in the first eight months, down 2.46% year-on-year. The slowdown in the joint venture segment is shifting profit pressure entirely onto the independent brands.

This pressure is even more evident in financial reports. GAC Group’s 2026 interim report showed: first-half revenue reached 46.121 billion yuan, up 9.38% year-on-year; net profit attributable to shareholders of the listed company was a loss of 4.467 billion yuan, compared to a loss of 2.538 billion yuan in the same period last year, a 75.98% year-on-year decline; core net profit (excluding non-recurring items) was a loss of 5.209 billion yuan; gross margin was -1.11%; and net cash flow from operating activities was -7.104 billion yuan.

This creates a stark contrast: on one hand, new energy vehicle sales grew nearly 70% year-on-year, with energy-saving and new energy models accounting for 62.82% of the mix; on the other, losses widened by 70% year-on-year, gross margin turned negative, and cash flow continued to hemorrhage. This means Qijing’s breakthrough significance extends far beyond sales volume.

The crux lies in sales structure. GAC’s independent brands still rely on mid-to-low-end models under the Aion brand for volume, with thin per-unit gross profits. Meanwhile, the premium segment—Hyper selling in the hundreds per month and Qijing barely exceeding 1,000 units per month—contributes almost no premium. This is the true significance of premium breakthroughs for GAC: it seeks not just to sell a few more tens of thousands of vehicles but to systematically repair per-unit gross profit, brand premium, and profit structure.

After Hyper’s failure, the burden of premium breakthroughs now falls on Qijing. To be sure, the GT7’s setback is not just a failure of a single model but another warning for GAC Group’s premium path. The Qijing GX7’s shift from the niche shooting brake segment to the mainstream family market is both a correction of the GT7’s failure and Qijing’s second exam. However, it should be noted that in the 200,000–300,000 yuan new energy market, the GX7 faces even steeper challenges—ones that cannot be overcome by orders alone.

From Qijing’s initial setback, it is clear that Huawei’s intelligent technologies can be fully integrated but cannot replace a brand’s own identity-building. Orders can create hype, and buzz can generate pre-launch momentum, but the ticket to the premium market ultimately depends on consistent, stable delivery and solid brand loyalty. As the new energy market enters a knockout phase, Qijing still holds Huawei as a trump card, but with GAC Group’s repeated premium failures, the opportunities to prove itself are dwindling.