Going global brought scale—but profits were halved first.

Great Wall's third-quarter report is full of contradictions!

Great Wall Motor recently released a third-quarter report that reads like a study in contrasts: overseas sales accounted for more than 50% of the total, shoring up overall volume, yet profit was nearly cut in half. Revenue edged up slightly, net profit plunged more than 50%, and profit per vehicle fell to just over 3,000 yuan. The excitement of going global failed to translate into real profit.

Revenue edges up, profit nearly halves, profit per vehicle down to just 3,800 yuan

In the first three quarters of 2026, Great Wall's revenue reached 159.869 billion yuan, up only 4.09% year on year; net profit attributable to the parent company was 3.826 billion yuan, plunging 55.69% year on year; net profit after deducting non-recurring gains and losses came in at 2.590 billion yuan, down 52.69% year on year. The third quarter alone was even more severe: revenue was 57.767 billion yuan, down 5.68% year on year; net profit attributable to the parent company was 1.362 billion yuan, down 40.75% year on year; and net profit after deducting non-recurring gains and losses was 980 million yuan, a drop of 48.25%.

The financial report attributed the profit decline to delays in overseas subsidies, exchange rate fluctuations, and intense competition in the domestic auto market. But securities firms have crunched the numbers and made the picture clear: after stripping out exchange gain or loss disturbances, Guojin Securities found that Great Wall's third-quarter net profit after deducting non-recurring gains and losses per vehicle was only 0.38 million yuan? No—0.38 ten-thousand yuan, or 3,800 yuan, down 1,800 yuan year on year and 500 yuan quarter on quarter, leaving net profit of only 3,800 yuan per vehicle.

The core reason for the thinning profit is the continued deterioration of the product mix. Founder Securities data shows that the third-quarter average selling price (ASP) per vehicle fell to 172,000 yuan, down 2,000 yuan year on year; gross margin weakened at the same time, with the single-quarter gross margin at 17.3%, down 1.1 percentage points year on year and another 1 percentage point quarter on quarter, continuously breaking through new lows in profitability.

Pressure on the financial side further widened the profit gap: in the first three quarters, other income plunged from 3.219 billion yuan last year to 639 million yuan; financial expenses swung from 1.562 billion yuan to positive 402 million yuan, and the exchange gain dividend completely disappeared. Operating cash flow shrank sharply as well, with net operating cash flow of 6.219 billion yuan in the first three quarters, plunging 70.92% year on year. Even if the company explained it as overseas stockpiling and early payments to suppliers, the sharp contraction in cash flow is still a more alarming signal than the short-term profit decline.

High-end models lose speed across the board; low-priced models lift sales but lower profit

The root cause of diluted profit is the shrinking sales of high-premium models and the rapid rise in the share of low-priced models—a complete weakening of the product mix.

Tank, which once carried the profit banner, has seen sales fall off a cliff. In October, Tank sold only 15,389 units, plunging 31.01% year on year; cumulative sales in the first 10 months fell 15.61%. The boxy off-road segment is no longer Tank's alone: the Fang Cheng Bao Tai 7 plug-in hybrid starts at 195,800 yuan, and the Jetour Traveler starts at 125,900 yuan. Low-priced competitors are frenziedly eroding the market, and Tank's premium advantage has completely evaporated.

Haval, the brand's foundation, also could not withstand the price war. In October, Haval sold 71,027 units, down 19.5% year on year—nearly 17,000 fewer units in a single month; cumulative sales in the first 10 months fell 4.96% year on year. With BYD's Song series and Geely Galaxy firmly locking down the mainstream new-energy SUV price range, Haval New Energy has never been able to break through, and new-energy increment simply cannot fill the gap left by the continuous shrinkage of fuel vehicles.

Wey, striving upward, has fallen into a scale dilemma. October sales were only 8,648 units, failing to break 10,000, and its high-endization push has long failed to gain traction.

Ora, the only one maintaining high growth, has become a double-edged sword: October sales were 12,187 units, soaring 115.78% year on year, and sales in the first 10 months directly doubled. But both Guojin and Founder Securities pointed out consistently: the share of Ora's low-priced models rose significantly, directly dragging down overall average selling price per vehicle and gross margin. Sales of high-end Tank and Wey declined, while low-end Ora rapidly expanded volume. Between the rise and fall, the profitability of complete vehicles continued to be diluted.

Overseas sales account for more than half, but going global earns scale, not profit

More than half of the new cars Great Wall sells now go overseas. In the first three quarters of 2026, overseas sales were 476,000 vehicles, soaring 42% year on year; from January to October, cumulative overseas sales were 538,800 vehicles, accounting for more than 50% of total sales. Overseas has become the only pillar stabilizing sales.

But while sales surged, profitability has been slow to materialize. Great Wall's overseas business gross margin has fallen from 26.01% in 2023 to 6.70% in 2025, already lower than the 18.61% gross margin of its domestic business. The more it sells overseas, the thinner overall profit becomes.

Seventy percent of overseas sales come from Haval exports, while Haval's domestic base has continued to weaken. Overseas volume models are mainly affordable models with thin profits. Localized factories in Europe are still in the investment period: the Bulgaria production line will only complete renovation at the end of the year, and the Ora 5 will not roll off the line until the first quarter of 2027, with annual capacity of 50,000 vehicles. In the short term there is only investment, no return, and overseas profit realization is far off.

Also expanding aggressively overseas, Geely has moved in the completely opposite direction. In the first three quarters, Geely exported 798,000 vehicles, soaring 169% year on year; total revenue was 272.6 billion yuan, core net profit attributable to the parent company was 14.9 billion yuan, up 41% year on year, gross margin rose 1.5 percentage points against the trend, and profit growth > revenue growth > sales growth. Export scale was smoothly transformed into profit increment.

In contrast, Great Wall: overseas sales raced ahead, while net profit attributable to the parent company was directly halved. Overseas expansion is still in the stage of burning money to build factories and grabbing markets at low prices. The scale dividend has not yet landed, and profit has already been eaten away by costs and the price war.

The industry is under collective pressure; Great Wall lags in product conversion capability

The entire auto industry is now in a profit winter. Data from the China Passenger Car Association shows that in January-September this year, the sales profit margin of the complete vehicle industry was only 3.3%, and in September alone it was as low as 1.4%, a four-year low, with total industry profit down 23% year on year.

But even in the same price war, the differentiation among leading automakers is extremely obvious. BYD's net profit attributable to the parent company in the third quarter exceeded 10 billion yuan, up 28% year on year, and net margin recovered to 4.52%; Fang Cheng Bao sold 43,872 units in October, 2.85 times Tank's sales, overtaking its rival in the hardcore new-energy segment.

Geely's high-end segment continued to expand volume: the Galaxy series sold 153,400 units in October, Zeekr's sales doubled in the first three quarters, and the revenue share of high-end brands rose from 17.7% to 31.3%, with high-end models propping up the profit base.

Great Wall holds solid technology: the Hi4-T hybrid pickup won the sales champion in its segment, the Tank 700 won the production group championship in the Taklimakan Rally, and the Guiyuan platform is compatible with five powertrains. Its technology reserve is solid enough. But technology has consistently failed to translate into end-market sales: Tank was overtaken by Fang Cheng Bao, Haval cannot beat the Song PLUS and Galaxy, and Wey has long failed to gain volume, so it can only rely on low-priced Ora to lift sales. Product high-endization is retreating step by step.

Frankly speaking, Great Wall is now caught in a dilemma: domestic high-end models have collectively lost speed, and the high-profit base continues to shrink; overseas sales prop up half the business, but are mainly affordable volume models, compounded by continuous investment in overseas factories. Sales bring only scale, not profit.

Overseas sales accounting for more than half does not mean profitability resilience is more than half; possessing a full set of hybrid technology does not mean it can win the mainstream new-energy price war. Great Wall must solve two problems next: first, stop the sales decline of core models such as Tank and Haval and stabilize the product profit structure; second, shift overseas exports from "low-price volume" to high-gross-margin model output, and truly turn overseas scale into profit increment.

If high-end models remain weak and low-priced models continue to raise their share, then the net profit of 3,800 yuan per vehicle may continue to move lower.