'Iron Man' Elon Musk has delivered another grand gift to the capital markets with his Martian dreams—SpaceX, a 'crazy idea' worth $27 million 20 years ago, has transformed into a $2 trillion space commercial empire.

In fact, in the earlier exploration of space economics, 'Musk Strikes Again with a Blockbuster: SpaceX Reshapes Space Economics,' Dolphin Research already explained how SpaceX evolved from a cost-reduction idea into a viable business model.

Now, armed with clearer data from the prospectus, Dolphin Research reconstructs SpaceX from the perspectives of valuation and business operations:

In this report, Dolphin Research explores the following questions:

1) Valuation Transformation: How did SpaceX rise to prominence? What were the core drivers behind each billion-dollar 'valuation explosion'?

2) Business Matrix: How are the company's current core business landscape and capital flows distributed?

3) Launch Market Foundations: How long can the absolute monopoly barrier of 80% market share be maintained? Why has revenue growth in the launch business been slow despite a surge in capacity? How will the full orbital deployment of Starship shatter market ceilings?

Below is a detailed analysis.

I. From 'Disruptor' to 'Trillion-Dollar Infrastructure Builder'

The company's products—Starship, Starlink, etc.—sound like something out of 'Star Trek.' Stripped of their sci-fi gloss, they essentially involve building ships, sailing out to sea, casting nets, and reaping the catch.

Of course, the difference is that SpaceX's 'ships' are launch vehicles, its 'nets' are space communication networks, and its 'catch' is network communication fees—and possibly future space computing fees.

The foundation of this entire space economy is building a transport vessel capable of delivering these 'nets' into space. While launching rockets into space is nothing new, achieving economic feasibility at scale hinges on reducing vessel and transport costs. This is where SpaceX broke through:

(1) Persevering Through 'Daydreams': Before SpaceX, the aerospace launch sector was small and dominated by few players (Boeing and Lockheed Martin), with pricing based on cost-plus models. After the 2003 'Columbia' disaster, NASA outsourced low-Earth orbit (LEO) transport, switching to 'fixed-price' and 'milestone payment' models, creating survival space for SpaceX, founded in 2002.

After three consecutive failures, SpaceX's fourth 'Falcon 1' launch succeeded in 2008, securing a $1.6 billion NASA contract and giving the company hope for survival. Its valuation rose from $27 million at founding to $200 million, with pricing shifting from backing a 'madman's dream' to showing early promise.

(2) Rocket Reusability: The Hardcore Innovation. Reducing launch costs through methods others couldn't replicate became the core of the chain. Musk's solution was rocket reusability technology.

This became reality in late 2015 with the recovery of the first-stage booster, slashing the Falcon 9's per-launch cost from ~$50 million to ~$15 million (with reuse exceeding 20 times). By March 2017, SpaceX became the first to conduct commercial launches using recovered first-stage boosters.

In 2018, building on the Falcon 9, the 'heavy-lift' Falcon Heavy (with a 63.8-ton payload) debuted, halving launch costs again. By this point, legacy players could no longer keep up.

The company's valuation surged to $12 billion during its technological breakthrough phase (2010–2015) and jumped to $30.5 billion after technological maturity and commercialization (2015–2019), with pricing beginning to reflect a premium for technological leadership.

(2) Casting Nets and Reaping Rewards: Communications Satellite Network and Fees

While space transport cost reductions progressed, external demand remained limited, capping valuations below $50 billion. The real valuation driver was using this technology to build a downstream commercial empire—the Starlink broadband satellite network.

A basic explanation: Low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites are categorized by altitude. Starlink's satellites typically operate below 2,000 km, classifying them as LEO satellites.

These satellites offer low communication latency due to their proximity to Earth. However, they orbit rapidly (~90–120 minutes per revolution), covering any single Earth location for only ~15 minutes. Continuous coverage requires a constellation of many satellites (Musk's Starlink), ensuring seamless handoffs between satellites.

Thus, Musk expanded from building 'ships' to casting his own 'nets,' dramatically increasing transport demand. The 'net-casting' phase spanned 2020–2023, with 'reaping rewards' becoming evident post-2023.

By 2023, Starlink's revenue surpassed that of launch services, becoming SpaceX's primary revenue source. By 2025, Starlink accounted for 61% of revenue, with nearly 9 million subscribers.

A perfect commercial 'flywheel' has taken shape: High-frequency launches reduce satellite costs → Satellite constellations enhance network value → C-end subscriptions/B-end commercial use generate stable cash flow → Cash funds next-gen rocket (Starship) R&D.

With technological leadership and a commercial closed loop, capital valuations began repricing SpaceX as a 'high-barrier communication infrastructure' provider with a 'SaaS-like subscription model,' catapulting its valuation from below $100 billion to $800 billion.

(4) The Next Big Play: Space Computing Hegemony?

With the satellite communications network thriving, the next planned 'big net' is the 'space computing network.' This network will be far costlier than the communications satellite network and require in-house AI model development. This new venture is a money sink, making going public seem essential.

To assemble this vision, Musk orchestrated a key move: Full acquisition of xAI (February 2026): Completed at a $1 trillion SpaceX valuation and $250 billion xAI valuation. xAI includes the 'Grok large model,' 'Colossus computing cluster,' and 'X platform.'

The core narrative is deploying hundred-GW-scale orbital AI data centers via Starship V3's ultra-low launch costs (target: <$200/kg to orbit), leveraging space's boundless solar energy to slash computing costs (theoretically ~1/10 of terrestrial costs). Musk clearly believes the future AI endgame hinges on energy control.

This move abruptly expands SpaceX's addressable market from '$0.37 trillion space solutions + $1.6 trillion global connectivity' to a '$26.5 trillion AI market,' totaling $28.5 trillion (excluding China and Russia). Enterprise applications will dominate ~80% of this future TAM.

While space-based AI data centers remain conceptual—facing major engineering challenges like heat dissipation, hardware iteration, power transmission, and space radiation—they provide SpaceX a multi-trillion-dollar 'long-term growth option.'

II. Where Does the 'Trillions in Wealth' Come From?

From 2023 to 2025, SpaceX has formed a 'Space (transport/launch), Broadband Connectivity (Starlink), AI (Artificial Intelligence)' trifecta; total revenue soared from $10.4 billion to $18.7 billion, a 34% increase.

Revenue Structure: Transport Understates, Network Monetizes, AI 'Burns Cash'

In SpaceX's financials, rocket transport is the 'hidden monk'—the core barrier but generating little revenue, primarily because it transports in-house cargo, not reflected as income: Space launch revenue grew at a mere 7.2% CAGR over two years; slow growth stems purely from SpaceX's strategic priority of internal supply.

The revenue pillar is the Starlink network built using this transport capacity: Its revenue contribution surged from 37% in 2023 to 61% in 2025, with a staggering 72% CAGR over two years. The AI segment, still in its infancy, contributed only ~4% CAGR over two years.

② Profitability: Starlink as the Cash Cow

With scaling effects, SpaceX's overall gross margin steadily climbed from ~41% in 2023 to 49% in 2025, with gross profit doubling ($4.28 billion to $9.22 billion).

Once the network was established, Starlink not only boosted revenue but also profits: Its gross margin leaped from 28% in 2023 to 48% in 2025, with gross profit growing at a 125% CAGR over two years.

Operating profit skyrocketed nearly 10x from $470 million to $4.4 billion, with a segment EBITDA margin of 63%—a true cash cow.

③ Feeding Two 'Cash Sinks' with Starlink Profits

With grand space conquest dreams, Starlink's profits won't be used for dividends. The two major 'cash sinks' are Starship and space AI.

AI: Operating losses of $6.4 billion exceeded Starlink's profits. Investments focus on two areas: AI R&D—$5+ billion in 2025 (59% of total R&D), and capex of $12.7 billion, accounting for >60% of capital outflows.

Space segment accounting losses: While Falcon 9 is highly profitable, Starship's critical R&D phase required $3 billion in iterations, turning the space transport business into a $660 million operating loss in 2025.

III. The Soul of Space Hegemony: Where Lies the Confidence in Space Transportation?

The foundation of the space edifice is space transportation. The key question here is: does space transportation possess true business barriers? Let us now explore this pivotal business.

This sector primarily comprises two core businesses: launch services, and launch and R&D operations. Together, they amounted to just $4.1 billion over 25 years, which is not a large sum.

1. Launch: Space Express

The primary transportation tools are the Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy rockets, with customers including commercial satellite companies (e.g., O3b, Viasat) as well as institutions and the U.S. government (e.g., NASA, Space Force), selling space "tickets and seats."

By the numbers: SpaceX conducted 165 Falcon rocket launches in 25 years (with the Falcon 9 being the absolute workhorse, accounting for 97% of launches), controlling 80% of the global mass to orbit and accounting for 86% of all U.S. launches.

However, in terms of revenue, since 74% of the total rocket launches were for transporting its own cargo, these were offset during consolidation, meaning the reported revenue of the Space segment does not reflect its true physical throughput and economic value.

The key technological edge lies in the reusability of the first-stage rocket, a significant advantage, along with the Falcon's large cargo capacity and low pricing.

2. Custom R&D: Exploring the "Deep Space Frontier"

On one side are mature commercial orders billed by suborbital flight/weight, and on the other are government R&D projects such as those from NASA (HLS Crew Lunar Lander) and the U.S. military.

These highly customized projects are recognized using the "milestone/completion progress method," with revenue dependent on the budget allocation pace of government agencies and SpaceX's progress in achieving key technical milestones (e.g., passing preliminary design reviews, completing engine ground test firings, achieving specific orbital tests). Consequently, revenue in this segment is nonlinear and fluctuates significantly with project cycles.

However, government and defense tasks within this segment (e.g., launching GPS satellites for the U.S. Space Force, executing classified payload missions) typically have systematically lower profit margins than pure commercial launch services due to different contract pricing mechanisms that account for higher security requirements, longer preparation cycles, and more complex measurement and control support.

The current core investment is in the development of the Starship rocket: aiming to be the world's first "fully and rapidly reusable" architecture (both stages recoverable, striving for extremely short turnaround times and rapid relaunch capability), reducing transportation pricing to $200/kg, compared to Falcon 9's ~$3,000/kg orbital price and traditional non-reusable rockets (~$18,500/kg).

If this cost can be achieved, the goals of transporting payloads for Starlink V3 satellite networking and space-based computing will naturally fall into place. The success or failure of the Starship will directly determine whether SpaceX can unlock the next $10 trillion-scale market—it is not only a strategic gamble for the Space segment but also decisive for the future valuation ceiling of the entire company.

For the Space business, three pivotal questions arise:

① How deep is the barrier to first-stage rocket reusability?

In Dolphin's view, the barriers primarily stem from engineering complexity, vertical integration, and hard-earned experience. Competitors will take a long time to catch up.

a. Technical Barriers: Engineering Challenges of the Highest Order

Vertical recovery is a systems engineering feat that defies physical laws. To land a rocket weighing dozens of tons and traveling at multiple times the speed of sound, fundamental engineering limits must be overcome across three dimensions: propulsion, control, and materials.

Propulsion (engines): Traditional fuels are prone to carbon deposition, affecting reusability, necessitating liquid oxygen-methane engines for longevity and reliability. Engines must also possess "deep throttle capability" (thrust reducible to below 40% to prevent backflight) and perfectly execute three high-altitude ignition decelerations under extreme conditions of high-speed descent and severe turbulence.

Control (the brain): The difficulty is comparable to "tossing chopsticks from dozens of kilometers high and landing them upright." As the rocket hurtles toward Earth at supersonic speeds, it must rely on titanium alloy grid fins at the top to efficiently counteract strong winds, correcting its attitude with millisecond-level precision to lock onto a shaking (shaking) recovery vessel at sea.

Materials (the skeleton): The exterior must withstand friction temperatures exceeding a thousand degrees Celsius during atmospheric reentry, while the interior must accommodate cryogenic propellants at -200°C. Simultaneously, the rocket body must be extremely lightweight to maximize payload capacity and offset the performance penalty from carrying recovery fuel.

For details, see the image below:

c. Vertical Integration: Core Competencies Kept In-House

Unlike traditional aerospace enterprises heavily reliant on tiered supplier systems, SpaceX's strategy is to internalize everything possible, achieving extreme vertical integration. Currently, SpaceX has achieved self-research and self-production of approximately "80% of core hardware, with only about 20%" of standardized or specially customized components sourced externally (e.g., specific high-precision sensors, specialized composite materials, and some general electronic components).

Vertical integration covers the most cost-intensive and technologically critical areas: rocket engines, airframe structures, and launch, recovery, and testing systems. Competitors face significant time costs to catch up.

c. Barriers of Launch Density and Flight Experience (Self-Sustaining Starlink Internal Cycle and Data Feeding):

In the commercial space market, "reliability" is the paramount metric. A high-orbit commercial communications satellite can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and a launch failure means years of investment lost. Thus, government and commercial clients prioritize flight experience above all else.

SpaceX has its own transportation business, providing frequent real-world trial-and-error opportunities. Each rocket launch returns vast amounts of extreme-condition data (temperature distribution, vibration frequency, aerodynamic disturbances, etc.) used to refine flight control code and structural models.

This "data flywheel" and engineering know-how, nurtured by hundreds of real flights, constitute an absolute "time barrier" that cannot be quickly overcome by simply throwing money at hiring talent.

d. Barriers of Cost and Pricing Power (Economic Dominance):

The reusability of the first-stage rocket, achieved through extreme engineering control, vertical integration, and accumulated launch experience, yields significant economic benefits:

In the hardware cost of the Falcon 9 rocket, the first-stage booster and fairing together account for 70%. Under the traditional "expendable" model, each launch incurred the full manufacturing cost of ~$50 million. The Falcon 9's first-stage booster has achieved up to 34 reuses (as of late 25), reducing the internal marginal cost per launch (including refurbishment, fuel, and control) to below ~$15 million, a 70% reduction.

This extreme cost advantage grants SpaceX absolute market pricing power: even while maintaining external quotes of ~$74 million/$62 million (standard launch/reusable launch), it enjoys extremely generous (generous) profit margins.

If faced with potential competition, SpaceX has ample "price-cutting ammunition" to reduce quotes below $30 million, sufficient to trap any competitor using expendable rockets in a "launch-one, lose-one" death spiral from the starting line.

From the gross margin perspective of the launch business, it rose from ~53% in 2023 to ~67% in 2025. The core driver is the systemic cost reduction from rocket reuse (increasing reuse counts lower marginal costs), while launch pricing has not declined synchronously and has even steadily increased, creating an ever-widening "gross margin price scissors (scissor gap)." Instead, SpaceX has continuously raised prices.

This reflects true supply-demand dynamics: SpaceX is leveraging its monopoly to reap high profits, while the market lacks low-cost, mature alternatives. This strategy ensures that cost reductions are almost entirely converted into company profits rather than passed on to clients, thereby funding the next generation of rocket R&D (Starship).

However, in Q1 2026, the gross margin of SpaceX's launch business fell from ~66% year-on-year to ~55%, primarily due to:

a. Changes in launch service revenue mix: With the full implementation of the U.S. Department of Defense's "National Security Space Launch" (NSSL) Phase II contracts and an increase in NASA Artemis program-related missions, the proportion of relatively low-margin government and defense tasks rose from ~35% year-on-year to ~47% in the same period of 2026, directly dragging down the overall gross margin.

b. Drag from new product Starship V3 R&D: As a brand-new rocket, Starship V3's manufacturing costs are far higher than those of the mature, mass-produced Falcon 9, which has undergone over 300 recovery validations. The new rocket's low yield rates and high supply chain run in (integration) costs have increased fixed costs per launch (e.g., airframe manufacturing, engine testing).

Although the 12th test flight of Starship V3 (May 2026) successfully completed most objectives, the first-stage booster crashed into the sea due to multiple engine restart failures, with test flight costs (including rocket hardware losses) directly booked to the current launch business costs, dragging down the gross margin.

Simultaneously, the depreciation and amortization costs from Starship's massive capital expenditures are partially booked to the cost side, further diluting profit levels.

②. How much longer does SpaceX lead in reusable technology?

Judging from the current progress of competitors in reusable technology, SpaceX still maintains an overwhelming lead. However, different competitors are at varying stages of catching up:

First Tier: Bezos' Blue Origin. The New Glenn rocket is set to achieve successful first-stage rocket sea recovery in November 2025, becoming the second company globally to achieve orbital-class rocket recovery. It will achieve its first reuse and recovery in April 2026, marking a breakthrough from 0 to 1.

However, due to insufficient accumulation of reuse experience, the New Glenn has not yet entered a stage of stable reuse and commercial operation. In contrast, the Falcon 9 has accumulated over 10 years of engineering experience and more than 300 recovery instances since its first successful recovery in 2015. It is expected to take several more years for the New Glenn to reach the current level of stable operation achieved by the Falcon 9.

Second Tier: Rocket Lab. The Electron small rocket has partially validated its first-stage recovery and engine reuse capabilities through a parachute descent approach (having successfully reused an engine once). However, full rocket reuse has not yet been achieved.

The highly anticipated Neutron rocket, Rocket Lab's counterpart to the Falcon 9, is expected to conduct its maiden flight in the second half of 2026, without attempting vertical recovery initially. Therefore, substantial competition with SpaceX's Falcon 9 is at least 2-3 years away. The true test will be whether the Neutron can achieve successful recovery at that time.

Third Tier: China's Commercial Space Sector. As of June 2026, China has not yet achieved successful recovery of an orbital-class rocket, placing it in the "pre-recovery era." However, China is at a critical stage of partial breakthroughs and intensive sprints: the Long March 10B is poised for its maiden flight and will validate the world's first sea-based net recovery system. Companies like LandSpace's ZQ-3 and Galactic Energy's ForceArrow II are also undergoing intensive launch validations.

The industry widely expects that from the second half of 2026 to the first half of 2027, China is likely to achieve the "zero breakthrough" in reusable rockets, officially becoming the second country globally, after the United States, to possess this capability.

Overall, global competitors are still striving to overcome the technological threshold of moving 'from 0 to 1,' while SpaceX has already entered the phase of data-driven scaling and exponential growth 'from 1 to 100.' This rigid time gap of 10-12 years cannot be bridged by capital alone in the short term.

③. Why is the launch market still 'niche' despite lower prices?

In 2024, the global rocket launch market was valued at approximately $18.7 billion. According to Precedence Research, it is projected to reach $64.3 billion by 2034, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of around 13%. Compared to other explosive tech sectors (e.g., satellite internet, AI computing), this growth rate appears relatively modest.

From Dolphin Research's perspective, two key bottlenecks exist:

1. Demand-Side Structure: Dominated by stock game (literally 'stock competition,' meaning competition within an existing market without significant growth):

a. The traditional communications satellite (GEO) market is saturated or even shrinking: Core clients (e.g., international satellite communications organizations) procure large geostationary orbit (GEO) satellites characterized by high unit prices and long lifespans (15+ years). This is essentially a market driven by replacement demand. Coupled with the depletion of GEO orbital slots, the global annual launch volume remains at a dozen to twenty satellites, making the market extremely stable but lacking growth elasticity.

b. Government and defense missions are high-value but low-frequency: Core clients (e.g., NASA, the U.S. Space Force, and national space agencies) award contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars per mission for deep space exploration or high-value reconnaissance satellites. However, these missions involve extremely long development cycles and infrequent launches, failing to support normalized, high-frequency launch operations.

c. Non-Starlink low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations are lagging and lack economies of scale: Other players face high transportation costs, making commercial viability unattainable. Only Starlink has successfully established a broadband subscription model in the consumer (C-end) market, creating a virtuous cycle of 'launch → network deployment → operation → profitability → re-launch.' To some extent, SpaceX selectively prioritizes self-supply of transport capacity for low-cost launches, forming a downstream commercial monopoly at scale.

d. The remote sensing and micro/small satellite market is 'long-tail' with low average contract values: This market is supported by long-tail clients such as universities and startups. Micro/small satellites are lightweight, with single-contract values as low as the million-dollar range, heavily reliant on 'rideshare/hosted launches.' While launch volumes are increasing, their share of the total addressable market remains minuscule, making it difficult to independently sustain high growth.

2. Supply-Side and Industrial Synergy: Cost barriers persist, and upstream/downstream capacity is disconnected from commercial closed loop (closed-loop) operations:

a. Absolute launch costs remain a significant barrier to emerging demand: While SpaceX's reusable Falcon 9 has slashed commercial launch prices from $10,000-20,000/kg to around $3,000/kg, this remains prohibitively expensive for most scientific and commercial missions.

Until costs achieve a leapfrog reduction (e.g., below $100/kg), economic models for new applications like space tourism, space-based pharmaceuticals, and in-orbit manufacturing cannot be viable. Additionally, high satellite insurance premiums further inflate clients' comprehensive costs.

Thus, only when next-generation fully reusable launch vehicles (e.g., Starship) reduce launch costs to the $100s or even $10s/kg range and achieve 'airliner-like' turnover rates—turning rockets into low-cost 'space trucks'—can downstream new applications truly explode. Only then will the rocket launch market experience true exponential growth.

b. 'Rockets wait for satellites': Satellite manufacturing cycles are long, and payload capacity is the bottleneck. Even with ample rocket capacity, traditional satellite manufacturing remains stuck in 'artisanal' or small-batch customization phases, with high-value satellites often taking 2-3 years to build. To some extent, SpaceX monopolizes satellite manufacturing capacity.

④. What is the progress of Starship, the next-gen killer product? When will it achieve mature reuse of both stages?

While Falcon 9's reuse technology has reached its limits, with single-mission marginal costs reduced to approximately $15 million, this figure is constrained by irreducible costs such as the non-recoverable second stage, propellant, and refurbishment. It is nearing physical limits.

To achieve an order-of-magnitude reduction in orbital launch costs (from ~$700-1,000/kg to below $200/kg) and unlock higher-value downstream applications (e.g., large-scale Starlink V3 deployment, space-based AI data centers), full reusability of both Starship's first-stage booster and second-stage spacecraft is essential.

Currently, Starship's development is accelerating. On May 23, 2026, Starship successfully completed its 12th test flight, the first for the V3 version.

This flight validated several key upgrades: a new Raptor 3 engine, improved thermal protection (via removal of some heat shield tiles to test extreme heat flux data), and the spacecraft's ability to release 20 simulated Starlink V3 satellites and 2 modified satellites in orbit. The spacecraft achieved a controlled splashdown in the Indian Ocean.

Although the first-stage booster disintegrated and crashed into the sea due to multiple engine restart failures during return, the spacecraft successfully completed over 95% of its primary mission objectives. This flight marked Starship's transition from 'technical validation' to 'capability validation.'

Timelines for mature reuse of both stages must be evaluated separately:

First-stage recovery: Starship has already validated the launch, recovery, and reflight capabilities of its Super Heavy booster in multiple test flights, with the technical path largely proven. The first stage is expected to reattempt and likely succeed in recovery during the 13th or 14th test flight.

Second-stage recovery: This is the final hurdle for Starship's 'full reusability.' Currently, the spacecraft has only achieved soft ocean landings, not tower capture and refurbishment. Its thermal protection system, re-entry control, and landing precision require further iterations.

Musk has previously stated that Starship will achieve full rocket reusability in 2026, with orbital payload delivery missions expected to begin in the second half of 2026.

Following full validation, Starship will first deploy SpaceX's own Starlink V3 satellites (capable of launching up to 60 satellites per mission, adding over 60 Tbps of network capacity per 2-3 monthly flight validations). It will then enter a mature phase of commercial launch services for external clients around mid-2027 (after 5-6 flight validations).

This timeline aligns with market expectations for Starship to begin deploying orbital AI computing satellites in 2028—commercial maturity of Starship is a prerequisite for deploying space-based computing infrastructure.

Regarding cost targets, Starship aims to reduce unit launch costs to $200/kg in fully reusable mode. This will enable large-scale Starlink V3 deployment (each satellite offering 20x the capacity of Gen 2, with ~60 satellites per Starship launch), space-based AI data centers (planned from 2028), and far-future trillion-dollar markets like Mars exploration.

In essence, Starship's full reusability progress will determine whether SpaceX evolves from a 'capacity hegemon' to a 'cross-interplanetary infrastructure platform.' It is the sole bridge between SpaceX's current cash cow and future trillion-dollar options, as well as the core driver for the rocket launch market to leap from a $10 billion scale to higher orders of magnitude.

Overall, in space transportation, Musk appears to have delivered another asset with no peers in sight, even through a telescope. In subsequent analyses, we will focus on satellite manufacturing and communications network businesses—stay tuned.

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