Author | Chen Wen

Source | Dongjian Research Institute

HarmonyOS was initiated in 2015, released in 2019, and by 2024, it had received certification from the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, indicating a 100% self-developed system kernel ratio and an A-level maturity level.

That's right, we're talking about HarmonyOS.

With the release of "Pure-blood HarmonyOS" (HarmonyOS NEXT, no longer compatible with Android) in July this year, the previous doubts about it being a "shell for Android" have dissipated, marking the culmination of a "ten-year long march."

HarmonyOS's impressive achievements stem not only from technological breakthroughs but also from its market success.

In the fourth quarter of 2023, HarmonyOS held a 16% market share, trailing iOS's 20%.

By the first quarter of 2024, HarmonyOS surpassed iOS with a 17% market share in China, becoming the second-largest operating system after Android.

We know that "self-developed systems" are difficult, but HarmonyOS has shown us just how difficult they can be.

01 Symbian's Past

In the era of smartphones, iOS deserves credit for Apple's triumph over Nokia, while Android played a crucial role in Samsung and Xiaomi's rise to compete with Apple.

However, before iOS and Android, mobile phone manufacturers lacked a clear direction for self-developed systems. Even Symbian, once dominant, was essentially a "reskinned" version of Psion's PDA operating system, Epoc.

When Nokia released its first Symbian-powered phone, the 9210 Communicator, in 2000, it still bore distinct PDA characteristics. The Symbian OS V6.0 enabled internet access, email, fax, Bluetooth, and other advanced features for its time.

Revolutionarily, Symbian supported third-party applications developed in C++ and Java, outlining the early ecosystem for smartphone apps.

On the "Pure-blood Symbian" platform (Symbian OS S60), numerous iconic phones emerged, including the world's first gaming phone, the N-Gage, which resembled the popular GBA and attracted exclusive games from developers like EA.

Other notable models included the widely praised N-series (N95), the music-focused XM series (5320 XM), and the touch-screen feature phone 5230, which sold 150 million units globally.

Nokia dominated the mobile phone market in those days, with Symbian holding a staggering 67% global market share in 2006. Despite its lead, Symbian eventually succumbed to iOS and Android.

In January 2007, Apple released the first-generation iPhone, redefining smartphones with its touchscreen interface, smooth animations, and multi-functionality. It sold 270,000 units in its first week in the U.S. and surpassed 1 million units in 74 days.

Nokia, slow to react, only introduced its touchscreen competitor, the 5800, in the fall of 2008. Although equipped with the latest Symbian S60v5 optimized for touchscreens, the experience paled in comparison to the iPhone.

Even Meizu's M8, released a few months later based on Microsoft's Windows CE system, surpassed the 5800 in design, UI, and user experience, prompting Microsoft to collect an M8 as a keepsake.

Android's rise was equally meteoric. Following HTC's release of the world's first Android phone, the T-Mobile G1, the once-dominant Symbian alliance began to crumble, embracing Android instead. Nokia remained the sole holdout before eventually exiting the stage.

02 Breaking Through

Retrospectively, Symbian's downfall can be attributed to three main factors.

Firstly, Symbian was a product of the feature phone era, with an outdated system architecture. Even with iOS and Android as blueprints, Symbian struggled to implement new features, compounded by a fragmented app ecosystem and compatibility issues.

Secondly, Nokia's dominance in the feature phone era allowed it to rest on its laurels, neglecting innovation. This complacency allowed Apple to seize the opportunity to "redefine the phone," ultimately overtaking Nokia.

Thirdly, Nokia was slow to respond to change, lacking a clear strategy. A case in point: it took three years after the first iPhone's release for Symbian to introduce touchscreen compatibility.

An interesting aside: In 2005, Nokia developed the Maemo operating system specifically for touchscreens based on Linux. However, profits from Symbian overshadowed innovation, and it wasn't until pressure from iOS and Android forced Nokia's hand that it released the N900, the first smartphone with Maemo, in 2009.

In 2010, Nokia announced a partnership with Intel to develop MeeGo, a joint project combining Maemo and Intel's Moblin. Just as everyone anticipated MeeGo's counterattack against iOS and Android, Nokia's newly appointed CEO, Stephen Elop, chose to "fully embrace Microsoft" instead.

In warfare, the worst mistake is to lose one's own footing.

Given Symbian's downfall despite its advantages, how did HarmonyOS break through iOS and Android's monopoly on smart devices?

Drawing parallels to Symbian's failures, let's examine what Huawei did right.

Firstly, during HarmonyOS's incubation phase, Huawei had already amassed a significant user base under the Android ecosystem. In 2019, the year Huawei was added to the U.S. Entity List, it shipped a record 240 million smartphones, surpassing Apple (just under 200 million) and trailing only Samsung (300 million).

Huawei's initiation of HarmonyOS reflected both its forward-thinking and innovation drive. When HarmonyOS was officially launched, it had a higher starting point than many nascent systems, boasting a substantial user base.

Secondly, when transitioning from Android to HarmonyOS, Huawei adopted a compromise strategy, introducing a dual-framework system initially. This allowed the system to run both HarmonyOS native apps and compatible Android apps, ensuring a seamless user experience.

Lastly, to catch up with iOS and Android, HarmonyOS underwent rapid iterations.

HarmonyOS made its hurried debut at Huawei's Global Developer Conference in 2019, initially appearing on smart TVs ("Smart Screens"). Over the next three years, it evolved to version 4.0.

In June 2021, HarmonyOS 2.0 began rolling out to phones, tablets, and watches. HarmonyOS 3.0 was officially released in July 2022, and HarmonyOS 4.0 debuted on the Mate 60 alongside Huawei's self-developed Kirin 9000S chip in August 2023.

Fueled by the Mate 60's popularity, Huawei's mobile business regained mainstream attention, and "Pure-blood HarmonyOS" achieved a remarkable turnaround.

03 Not Time to Celebrate Yet

Regarding HarmonyOS's current competitive landscape, Huawei's internal perspective is candid. Gong Ti, President of Huawei's Terminal BG Software Department, publicly stated, "HarmonyOS has won two of its three battles: the foundation and user experience. The third battle is the ecosystem. If the ecosystem succeeds, so will HarmonyOS."

The so-called "ecosystem battle" has two primary hurdles: covering 99% of apps used by average consumers (approximately 5,000 apps) and satisfying niche user demands with a vast app store (around 500,000 apps).

The former ensures quality, while the latter guarantees quantity.

The "ecosystem battle" encompasses two aspects. Firstly, the internal technology ecosystem.

For instance, HarmonyOS is optimized for Huawei's self-developed Kirin SoC in phones and the Kirin A2 chip in its Starlink products. Just as wearing the right shoes enables one to walk farther and faster, software and hardware compatibility are crucial.

Beyond hardware-software integration, HarmonyOS boasts "once-developed, multi-device deployment" capability. Developing a HarmonyOS native app allows it to run on all Huawei devices, significantly reducing developers' workload. Huawei's foray into new energy vehicles has further fueled excitement about HarmonyOS's potential in automotive scenarios.

The second aspect is the external app ecosystem. In essence, it's about attracting developers to collaboratively develop those 5,000 essential and 500,000 niche apps.

Currently, Huawei aims to train over 100,000 HarmonyOS developers monthly, establishing "HarmonyOS classes" at universities like Wuhan University and Shanghai Jiao Tong University to nurture a new generation of developers.

The challenge lies in HarmonyOS's current developer base of approximately 2.54 million, a nearly tenfold difference from Android and iOS. As Huawei's internal momentum wanes, uncertainties arise about developers' willingness to keep pace and actively contribute to the ecosystem.

During the evolution of smartphones, Samsung also attempted to break free from Android's grip with its self-developed operating system, Bada, based on the Linux kernel.

Launched in 2009, Bada borrowed heavily from iOS and Android in terms of system logic and UI design (similar to Samsung's Android phones' TouchWiz interface). To address early software scarcity, Bada was compatible with Java apps.

Despite subsequent phone launches with Bada, sales lagged far behind Samsung's Android devices. Bada's market share even trailed that of the declining Symbian, leading Samsung to discontinue Bada's development in 2013.

History serves as a mirror. HarmonyOS's success hinges on perseverance, spanning phones to tablets, vehicles, smart homes, and even future PCs. It's a long-term plan encompassing chips, hardware, talent, and software.