On April 24, at the Beijing Auto Show, Zhang Xiong, President of GAC Group’s Hyper Aian Business Unit (BU), took center stage to relaunch two brands simultaneously—Aian, repositioned as a “Smart and Joyful Life | Effortless Living” brand for the mainstream market, and Hyper, now defined as “Smart and Empowered Living | Empowering Lifestyles” for the premium segment.

This marked the first clear articulation of the dual-brand strategy four months after the launch of the “Panyu Initiative” reform: one brand aiming to build mass-market appeal, the other crafting elite vehicles, with both operating in harmony without cannibalizing each other’s market share.

Five months on, the initial results of Zhang Xiong’s relaunch are in, but a clear path to success remains elusive.

Slumping Sales: Aian N60 Struggles to Gain Traction

Zhang Xiong’s rebranding of Hyper and Aian got off to a shaky start.

In April, under the Hyper Aian BU framework, both brands underwent revitalization. The Aian N60 and Hyper S600 were subsequently launched as flagship models for their respective rebranding efforts on April 28 and June 12, respectively. However, their market performance has been underwhelming. The Aian N60, for instance, saw its sales drop from 5,173 units in its debut month to just 3,482 units in August.

In the fiercely competitive 100,000-yuan-level pure electric SUV segment, this is far from impressive. Ranking tenth or lower in August sales for this category, the 3,482 units sold failed to make a mark.

As the first model under Aian’s revitalized brand mission, the N60 initially showed promise. Priced between 109,800 and 129,800 yuan, it came equipped with LiDAR, 4D millimeter-wave radar, a 200TOPS computing platform, and amorphous alloy electric drives. It also partnered with WeRide to introduce L4-level autonomous driving algorithms to the 100,000-yuan market, promoting the slogan “top-tier features from the start.”

Regarding the Aian N60, Zhang Xiong stated that it is the first model under the Hyper Aian BU, targeting young, tech-savvy consumers with advanced intelligent driving as a core selling point.

However, the challenge lies in the market segment itself. The 100,000-yuan-level pure electric SUV market is one of the most mature and competitive, with a dense lineup of joint-venture and domestic new energy models such as BYD Yuan PLUS, Leapmotor B10, Platinum Intelligence 3X, and Deepal S05. The Aian N60’s “intelligent driving for all” proposition lacks a compelling edge. It even faces internal competition—the family-oriented Aian i60, operating in a similar segment, maintains stable monthly sales exceeding 10,000 units, serving as Aian’s true sales pillar.

It’s worth noting that in GAC Group’s 2025 annual report, the company explicitly stated, “Ensure the successful launch of new products such as the Qijing series, Hyper A800, and Aian N60 to enhance market share.”

Yet, the current performance of the Aian N60 means that after the “retirement” of former bestsellers AION S and AION Y, the N60, expected to fill the void, has failed to become the next blockbuster. This suggests that Aian’s growth still heavily relies on the Aian i60, and the “full matrix of blockbusters” has not materialized. From January to August, the Aian i60 alone accounted for nearly 40% of the brand’s total domestic sales.

Failed Turnaround: S600 Fails to Prop Up Hyper

If the Aian N60’s slumping sales were merely “below expectations,” the Hyper S600’s performance directly calls into question the viability of the “high-end new energy” brand—resulting in continued marginalization and struggle to break through.

However, the top-tier specifications did not translate into sales. Data shows that the Hyper S600 sold only 421 units in its debut month, 446 units in July, but sales dropped to 282 units in August, with cumulative sales since launch reaching just 1,264 units. Even during its post-launch peak, monthly sales hovered in the low hundreds, rendering it almost invisible in the 200,000-yuan-level new energy SUV market and effectively eliminating it from competition.

This is not the first time Hyper’s “fully loaded” strategy has failed. In March, Hyper launched the Hyper A800, a mid-to-large extended-range sedan equipped with Huawei’s ADS 4.1 intelligent driving, HarmonyOS cockpit 5, 896-line LiDAR, and a three-motor four-wheel-drive system, targeting the 300,000-yuan segment at a post-subsidy price of 160,000 yuan. Yet, sales remained dismal, with cumulative sales since launch reaching only 389 units.

Repeated failures and consistently low monthly sales clearly indicate that even a revitalization cannot save this brand. The root cause lies not in the products but in the brand’s repeated missteps.

In September 2022, GAC Group injected its pure electric platform, Xingling electronic and electrical architecture, and even a million-yuan-level supercar into Hyper, boldly proclaiming it as the “benchmark for China’s high-end intelligent electric vehicles.”

Four years later, Hyper’s performance is on the verge of elimination. Over these four years, Hyper has undergone two major rebrandings, transitioning from a sub-brand of Aian to independent operation and then merging back into Aian BU, with its brand identity changing three times. Each shift eroded consumer perception. With no clear answer to “Who is Hyper?” even generous configurations struggle to convert into user trust.

In GAC Group’s strategic positioning, Hyper has also shifted from “unlimited support” to a less prominent status. In 2025, the launch of the Qijing—a joint venture between GAC Group and Huawei—marked GAC’s decision to “start anew” in the high-end new energy market, destabilizing Hyper’s premium position for the first time. Meanwhile, within the Aian brand, the introduction of the independent Ray series and another push into the 200,000-yuan market signaled further misalignment of Hyper’s status.

BU System Reform: A Long Road Ahead for Zhang Xiong

The less-than-ideal performance of the two new models indicates that Zhang Xiong’s brand revitalization strategy has hit a snag and that the BU system reform for Hyper Aian still has a long way to go. On December 18, 2025, GAC launched the “Panyu Initiative” reform, merging Hyper and Aian into a unified BU, with Zhang Xiong appointed as President, wielding complete decision-making power from R&D to production and sales.

Objectively, Zhang Xiong’s tenure at Hyper Aian BU has not been entirely without merit. Official data shows that Hyper Aian BU has achieved positive growth for seven months this year, with the proportion of C-end private users steadily climbing to 81%. Third-party data indicates that from January to August 2026, amid a 12.1% year-on-year decline in domestic new energy passenger vehicle retail sales, Aian brand sales reached 180,000 units, roughly on par with the previous year.

These figures suggest that the BU system reform has indeed improved efficiency. However, the quality of growth requires closer examination. A key factor driving Hyper Aian BU’s growth is its expansion into overseas markets, largely relying on GAC Group’s systemic support. In the domestic market, the Aian i60, launched before the establishment of Hyper Aian BU, remains the stabilizing force in retail sales. Meanwhile, the two highly anticipated revitalized models post-BU establishment—one “starting strong but fading,” the other “unable to shoulder the burden”—have yet to make a significant impact.

This creates a stark contrast: while systemic efficiency improves and the C-end structure enhances, the initial product tests for brand revitalization have both fallen short.

“Brand revitalization” demands more than just a few extra tens of thousands of vehicles sold; it requires the market to genuinely accept the new value propositions of both brands. The current results indicate that this acceptance has not yet been achieved—Aian’s old “ride-hailing” label has faded with the rise in C-end sales but has not been entirely shed; Hyper’s fundamental question of “Who is it?” remains unresolved. Moreover, while old issues persist, new challenges have already emerged.

On July 28 this year, Aian introduced the new independent Ray series, with the first model being the mid-to-large pure electric sedan Ray7, featuring a revitalized glowing logo and targeting “young people’s first super pure electric vehicle.”

This marks a new test for Zhang Xiong’s brand revitalization. For Aian, this upward trajectory is not unfamiliar. When Hyper was still a sub-brand of Aian, its first mass-produced model, the Hyper GT, targeted the 200,000-yuan-plus pure electric sedan market with a price range of 219,900 to 339,900 yuan. Officially, it claimed over 20,000 orders within half a month of launch, but actual monthly sales plummeted from 2,003 units to triple digits, ending in failure.

Now, the same script plays out with a new protagonist: targeting the same 200,000-yuan-plus pure electric sedan market and aiming for an upward push, but with the player changing from Hyper to Aian. Amid repeated failures to break into the high-end market, whether Ray can rewrite Hyper Aian BU’s absence in the premium segment remains uncertain. For Hyper Aian BU and Zhang Xiong, with brand revitalization already having faltered, Aian’s renewed high-end push cannot afford to fail.