11/18 2026
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Recently, Mercedes-Benz's CEO announced the "100% in China, for China" strategy. The direction is right, but it addresses cost and speed issues — not product appeal. If the Chinese operation remains merely "producing German-defined cars at lower cost," then the fundamental pain point of Mercedes-Benz's unsellable electric vehicles will not be overcome. Only if this strategy truly places product definition authority and intelligent R&D authority in the hands of the Chinese team can it qualify as a genuine "turnaround."
Mercedes-Benz Sales Are Declining, and Electric Vehicles Are the Hardest-Hit Segment
Mercedes-Benz's global sales fell from 2.493 million vehicles in 2023 to 2.16 million in 2025 — a drop of more than 330,000 vehicles over two years. China sales fell from 765,000 vehicles in 2023 to 714,000 in 2024, then further dropped to 575,000 in 2025, a decline of 19%, before falling another 27% in the first quarter of 2026.
The pure electric segment is even more glaring: global pure electric sales in 2024 were 185,000 vehicles, down 23% year-on-year; in 2025, global pure electric sales were 168,800 vehicles, with fewer than 20,000 pure electric vehicles sold in China — accounting for only about 3.62% of total China sales. The penetration rate of new energy passenger vehicles in China has approached 60%, and the electric penetration rate in the luxury car segment has also approached 40%, yet Mercedes-Benz's electric vehicle share in China is almost negligible.
Even rising global oil prices have not made Mercedes-Benz electric cars sell well. Why?
The root cause of poor sales is not the switch between "oil" and "electricity" itself, but that Mercedes-Benz has lost the power to define "luxury electric vehicles." The early EQC's "oil-to-electric" conversion brought reduced space, inflated range claims, and recalls — directly damaging the brand's credibility in the electric era.
Although subsequent EQE and EQS models shifted to dedicated architectures at the platform level, the localization of the in-car ecosystem was insufficient, smart driving hardware and algorithms lagged behind domestic models at the same price point, and the R&D cycle remained as long as 42 months — twice that of local competitors.
More fatal is the shift in consumer logic: in Mercedes-Benz's core price band of 300,000 to 400,000 yuan, young Chinese consumers define luxury by "whether voice interaction is continuous, whether smart driving is usable, and whether OTA is pushed monthly," while Mercedes-Benz still treats mechanical texture and brand history as sources of premium pricing.
Rising oil prices will certainly accelerate awareness of fuel vehicle usage costs, but that is not the fundamental reason Mercedes-Benz electric cars do not sell well. The fundamental reason is that in those years when electrification truly began to determine the competition rules for luxury cars, the products Mercedes-Benz delivered gave people no reason to feel "this is a better electric vehicle."
Mercedes-Benz Enlists Chinese Factories to Produce and Develop Electric Vehicles — to Cut Costs and Compete Globally
The extent to which "100% in China, for China" can repair this root cause depends on a question obscured by the literal wording: in this strategy, is China a "production base" or a "decision-making center"? If the answer is the latter, the logic holds. Volkswagen has already proven the reality of cost space with data: producing electric vehicles in China costs up to 50% less than in Germany, battery procurement is more convenient, the R&D cycle is shortened by about 30%, and the labor cost gap is measured in multiples.
German labor costs are in some cases five times those of Eastern European factories, while the depth and efficiency of China's electric vehicle supply chain cannot be replicated by Germany in the short term.
The first strategic model, the pure electric E-Class, is planned to be put into production in China in the second half of next year. If R&D, supply chain, and product validation processes move forward simultaneously, Mercedes-Benz can at least compress iteration speed from "measured in years" to a pace close to the Chinese market.
But halving costs only solves "whether it can be built cheaply," not "whether anyone wants what is built." If "100% China for China" merely means that German-designed models are assembled in China at lower cost — without handing over the definition authority for in-car systems, smart driving, and cabin ecosystems to those who best understand Chinese users — then the result is simply repeating past unsellable products at lower cost.
Mercedes-Benz's real threshold for a turnaround is not whether German factories close, but whether the Chinese team has the power to say "the intelligent solution for this generation of models must be defined according to Chinese standards."
Can German Automakers Turn Chinese Joint Venture Factories into Export Bases? Tariff Barriers!
As for the idea of "relying on low-cost exports overseas," it exists logically, but should not be regarded as Mercedes-Benz's primary fallback. The literal promise of "100% China for China" is to serve the Chinese market, not to turn China into an output base for the world.
Volkswagen is already discussing expanding manufacturing exports from China, but Mercedes-Benz has not yet given an equally clear signal. Even if exports occur, trade barriers against Chinese-made electric vehicles in European and American markets — as well as the "Mercedes-Benz" brand's association with "Made in Germany" in the minds of overseas consumers — will constitute substantial friction.
Exports can become a supplementary item for capacity utilization, but they cannot replace winning competition in the Chinese market — because China is not only the largest single market, but also the testing ground with the fastest iteration speed and highest competition intensity for electrified products.
Final Thoughts
If Mercedes-Benz's first localized pure electric E-Class is launched first in China, will that automatically revive Mercedes-Benz's share? It will not happen automatically just because "costs have fallen." What Mercedes-Benz needs to prove is that the smart cabin, smart driving experience, and iteration pace of electric vehicles produced in China can enter the conversational sequence of mainstream Chinese new energy products — rather than remaining in the perception zone of "an electric car made by a traditional luxury brand." If it cannot do this, lower manufacturing costs will only make the loss-making unit price look a little better, but will not make the three-pointed star badge become irreplaceable again in the electric era.