Cybertruck Failed to Keep Musk, the Car Builder

11/18 2026 406

Cars continue to make way.

Originally published by Auto Pixel (ID: autopix)

Musk has pushed back the discontinuation of the Cybertruck by another few months.

On November 6, he announced that the Texas factory would gradually wind down production of the pickup truck in mid-2027 to make room for the Cybercab. Five days later, the deadline was extended to late summer to clear more of the backlog. He explained that the production extension was for "sentiment" rather than profit.

Tesla's product lineup was never abundant to begin with. From the Model S in 2012 to the Cybertruck in 2023, it took 11 years to build five main product lines aimed at individual consumers.

And in 2026, it decided to gradually abandon three of them. The Model S and Model X have already been discontinued, and the Cybertruck will only remain for a few more months. Back then, Musk proposed covering a broader automotive market with about 10 products; now, traditional consumer passenger vehicles are increasingly concentrated in the Model 3 and Model Y.

Alongside abandoning these products, Tesla's China sales in October hit a four-year low. Global sales also suffered two consecutive years of decline in 2024 and 2025.

Looking at the product plans over the years alongside today's choices, Musk is letting go of the ambition to be a car company with a full product lineup—abandoning the goal of becoming the Toyota or Volkswagen of the new energy era.

Tesla still survives by selling cars, but Musk no longer wants it to become the next Toyota. The company's once most important growth path is being rewritten by its founder himself.

01 From ten cars to two mainstays

As early as 2006, Musk formulated Tesla's first "Master Plan" for the company: first build expensive electric sports cars, use the money earned to develop lower-priced cars, and then use the resources accumulated from the latter to manufacture cheaper, higher-volume electric vehicles.

From the Roadster to the Model S, and then to the Model 3, Tesla has followed this path. In 2016, Musk released "Master Plan Part Deux," proposing to cover most of the personal consumer car market with the Model 3, a compact SUV, and a new type of pickup truck.

By the 2023 Investor Day, Tesla's annual sales had grown from 245,000 vehicles in 2018 to 1.31 million in 2022—more than quintupling in four years.

This was the moment when Musk was most confident about Tesla's future. He set the future target (around 2030) at 20 million vehicles per year, roughly twice that of Toyota.

When asked how many models would be needed, Musk estimated that about ten would be enough. From lowering prices to expanding categories to pursuing the world's largest automotive manufacturing scale, Tesla has always sought to win as many consumers as possible with as few models as possible.

The Cybertruck was a very important part of this plan. The U.S. pickup market is huge, and it is hard for a company that wants to grow its car business to ignore it. Musk wanted to build a cyberpunk-style futuristic war machine, but he also left a fallback.

In a 2018 interview, he said that if too few people liked the Cybertruck design, they would make a more traditional pickup later. In the thinking at the time, products could be adjusted, but the pickup segment could not be easily abandoned.

In the end, the Cybertruck did not sell at the scale he expected. The special design increased development and manufacturing difficulty, and it took four years from unveiling to first delivery. Recently, Musk also said that the vehicle is now profitable and that orders are more than they can handle. But he still decided to end production at the Texas factory and give the resources to the Cybercab.

▍Model S/X farewell edition deliveries

The old fallback plan for an ordinary pickup did not appear in subsequent product plans. The S/X were also not replaced by corresponding next-generation models, and the production line was ceded to the Optimus robot.

Projects such as the Semi and Roadster still exist, but Tesla no longer prioritizes expanding coverage of traditional passenger vehicles.

Its investment in cars has begun to have a clear boundary—namely, strict SKU control.

The Model Y L is the only new car this year, and it is one example. The Chinese market is important enough, and family buyers' need for space and seats is also worth Tesla responding to. Tesla lengthened the Model Y and launched a six-seat version for this purpose, but it is still based on a mature product.

Lengthening the body and adding seats will bring new development and validation work and will also increase some parts and supply chain complexity. However, it is easier to reuse existing technology, procurement, and manufacturing experience, and the additional investment is relatively controllable.

From cheaper cars to more types of cars, Tesla's expansion over the past decade and more has always revolved around winning more car consumers.

Today, developing an entirely new car, then iterating it around consumer needs and keeping it competitive for years, is becoming an investment Musk is less willing to bear.

02 Musk-style innovation meets its boundaries

On October 21, 2026, Musk said on Tesla's third-quarter earnings call that he hoped to achieve an annual production and sales scale of 5 million vehicles around 2030. Compared with the previous ambition of 20 million vehicles annually by 2030, this number has shrunk by three-quarters.

In October this year, Tesla retailed only 8,817 vehicles in China, down 66.1% year on year—a new low since July 2022. In terms of global sales, Tesla reached a peak of 1.81 million vehicles in 2023, fell to 1.79 million in 2024, and further dropped to 1.64 million in 2025.

Musk's usual approach in the past was to redo what an industry takes for granted, achieve order-of-magnitude improvements in cost and efficiency, and then scale the business to a size previously unimaginable.

In 2021, he demanded that the unit cost of SpaceX's Raptor engine be reduced from about $2 million to $200,000.

At a cost meeting, he asked the analyst responsible for costs how much the raw materials of a part costing about $13,000 were worth. The other person could not answer. Musk said about $200 and warned the person that if they could not grasp this information, they would have to leave. The next day, the analyst brought back a list of parts with the largest cost gaps, and they discussed how to reduce precision machining and rearrange manufacturing.

The ratio of finished product cost to raw material cost is what he calls the "idiot index." First principles then allow him to start from materials and physical constraints and recalculate how much room for improvement remains in existing design and manufacturing methods.

Making the expensive first stage of a rocket return to the ground and be reused also involves recalculating the cost of each launch by changing the entire system.

The early electric vehicle market gave this method a lot of room to work. Batteries were expensive, range was insufficient, and charging was inconvenient. Each time a common problem was solved, a large number of consumers had a reason to buy an electric vehicle.

Tesla built advantages around electrification, software, and manufacturing, and then applied these capabilities to the Model 3 and Model Y. In 2023, the Model Y became the world's best-selling car.

This approach is especially effective in the early stages of industry development. But as technology gradually matures, major breakthroughs become harder, and competitors are catching up quickly.

Competition and iteration in new energy vehicles increasingly require getting close to consumers and improving products around their specific needs. These needs can no longer be solved all at once by a single technological breakthrough; they have been broken down into dozens or even hundreds of improvements to be implemented by engineers. The innovation model Musk excels at is experiencing diminishing marginal returns in the automotive consumer market, and is even hitting a wall.

The 2023 facelift of the Model 3 removed the turn signal stalk and switched to steering wheel buttons; two years later, the Chinese version once again made the stalk standard and even offered an official retrofit service for 2,499 yuan.

The more mature the auto market becomes, the harder it is to satisfy buyers' needs with a small number of common metrics. The Cybertruck demonstrates this difficulty even more fully. In a 2020 interview with Automotive News, when asked about customer research, Musk said the team simply made a car they thought was cool and had a special appearance. He also hoped it would be highly practical, but the product definition first came from the team's imagination of an ideal pickup.

The team first determined an aggressive plan and then found a way to build it. Stainless steel forming, 48V low-voltage electrical systems, and steer-by-wire all left technological achievements. But a large amount of engineering investment was also used to overcome the difficulties brought by the predetermined product form. Engineers solved manufacturing problems one by one, but buyers still had to compare price, maintenance, towing, and charging to judge whether this was a pickup suitable for long-term use.

To get more people to buy, the product team also has to allow customer needs to change the original vision. One astonishing innovation can hardly replace the dozens or hundreds of improvements accumulated around actual use. Musk is good at breaking through the boundaries of technology and cost, but the approach of relying on a few big breakthroughs to continuously win in more vehicle categories exposed its limitations on the Cybertruck.

Toyota, BYD, and Geely also pursue big innovations and use platformization to improve efficiency. Operating a complete product line also requires them to apply these capabilities to cars at different price points, sizes, and uses, and to follow market feedback over the long term. Whether problems in customer use can lead the team to modify the original design, and what to change first in the next-generation model, both require product and engineering teams to make continuous judgments.

To continue growing the car business, Tesla needs to accept this way of arranging R&D around customer needs over the long term.

03 Cars make way, AI takes the table

In 2022, before the Cybertruck had been delivered and while Tesla's auto business was still growing rapidly, there was already internal debate about the direction of the next car.

Engineers on the automotive team wanted to develop an ordinary low-priced car, as envisioned in Tesla's original Master Plan. Musk wanted to focus on developing a Robotaxi with no steering wheel and no need for a human driver.

The engineers worried that if they did so, once autonomous driving and regulatory approval failed to mature on schedule, Tesla would lose its growth momentum after a few years. They argued for retaining a steering wheel and pedals for the next-generation product.

The team later proposed a plan of this kind, letting the two types of vehicles share a platform, production line, and components, which would both expand sales and leave room for autonomous driving. Musk accepted it for a time.

But by October 2024, he had changed his mind. Musk explicitly said on the earnings call that an ordinary $25,000 new car that requires a human driver no longer made sense and was inconsistent with the future of autonomous driving.

Looking at it now, the outcome of this debate represents Tesla's gradual abandonment of its original goal of becoming a scale automaker and the "Toyota" of the new energy era. On the surface, it was a choice between two automotive product routes, but behind it lies the difference between two kinds of companies.

If Tesla had continued to expand its product line and had ten models, it might have continued to capture the dividends of new energy vehicles, but the entire organization would likely have become more and more like Toyota. Each car would have its own customers, sales targets, and replacement cycle. The company would need to build a huge product development system so that R&D, manufacturing, and the supply chain would operate around these models. The most important work of management would also gradually become maintaining product competitiveness and ensuring stable deliveries and sustained growth.

This is the capability a mature automaker should have. But the more the organization operates around the existing car business, the harder it is to bet the most important resources over the long term on new technologies with uncertain prospects.

The physical AI company Musk wants to build requires another logic.

Autonomous driving and robotics have not yet matured in terms of technology routes, and commercial returns are hard to predict. They require long-term trial and error, concentration of excellent engineers, waiting for technological breakthroughs, and then replicating the results across large numbers of robots.

These two businesses can share manufacturing capabilities, but it is hard for them to always share the same set of principles.

Autonomous driving and robotics have given Musk a goal worth pursuing again. The factories have already begun adjusting for this. The S/X production line in Fremont has been stopped, and the space is being redirected to Optimus; the Cybertruck production space in Texas is planned to be handed over to the Cybercab. In the first three quarters of 2026, Tesla's capital expenditure reached $13.01 billion, compared with $6.13 billion in the same period last year. While the product line is narrowing, the company is still investing heavily.

Cars are still important. In the third quarter of this year, the automotive business contributed more than 70% of Tesla's revenue, and the 3/Y must continue to maintain competitiveness in core markets. Musk is giving up some auto markets he could have pursued in order to prevent Tesla from being defined as a car company.

Twenty years ago, Musk took a gamble on electric vehicles and ultimately transformed the entire automotive industry. Now, he is wagering the future of an already successful automaker on physical AI.

Is he, once again, seeing the future earlier than everyone else?

Or has the automotive industry already reached a point where it no longer needs Musk to define it?

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