07/15 2026
398
User mindset is unforgiving. When you open AutoNavi, your brain enters 'travel mode,' not 'consumption mode.'
In September 2025, AutoNavi Maps CEO Guo Ning took the stage at a product launch event to announce the 'AutoNavi Street Rankings' and solemnly pledged 'never to commercialize it.' The audience erupted in applause, but those familiar with the product knew this was merely a dignified way of describing yet another 'strategic retreat' in AutoNavi''s local services battle.
From Yu Yongfu''s era of 'Open Service Platform for Better Life Outside' to Guo Ning''s vision of a 'Spatial Intelligence Entity,' AutoNavi Maps has struggled in the local services arena for five full years. During this time, it integrated Koubei, connected with Starbucks'' 'Drive-Thru Pickup,' launched 'AutoNavi Instant Delivery,' introduced food Group buying (group buying) and travel booking services, and even enlisted Alibaba''s most powerful AI model, 'Tongyi Qianwen,' for support. Yet, what do users still do when they open AutoNavi? They navigate and hail rides—nothing more.
This isn''t a resource issue. AutoNavi boasts nearly 1 billion monthly active users, ranking as China''s fourth-largest mobile internet application after WeChat, Taobao, and Alipay. Within Alibaba Group, it has access to Ele.me''s delivery capabilities, Alipay''s payment systems, Taobao''s supply chain, and Qianwen AI''s technological edge. Despite this, AutoNavi remains an outsider in local services. User mindset acts as an invisible wall that no amount of Alibaba''s resources can breach.
Behind this lies the harshest lesson in China''s internet industry: the 'mindset curse' of utility-type products.
A Doomed Marriage: Koubei''s Fifth 'Drift'
To understand why AutoNavi fails at local services, we must first examine the story of a 'wanderer.'
On March 22, 2023, AutoNavi held an internal meeting. Alibaba Partner Yu Yongfu told hundreds of employees via screen: 'After the merger, stop saying 'you' or 'your team'—we''re all 'Team AutoNavi.'' That day, Alibaba''s offline business 'Koubei' officially merged into AutoNavi, completing its fifth 'drift' within the Alibaba ecosystem.
Koubei''s journey epitomizes one of China''s most tragic internet mergers. Acquired by Alibaba in 2008, it was shuffled between Taobao, Alipay, and Ele.me, each time with high hopes and each time departing in disgrace. The 2023 merger with AutoNavi was seen internally as 'the last hope'—AutoNavi had 800 million users, geographical location scenarios, and a consumption decision-making chain post-travel. It seemed the perfect home for Koubei.
But a secondary market analyst immediately poured cold water: 'The integration of AutoNavi and Koubei makes no logical sense because map tools can''t serve as traffic entry points for offline businesses. Meituan didn''t rise through maps either.'
That comment hit the nail on the head.
Meituan succeeded through a 'ground-level iron army' that scoured streets store by store, deep merchant operations and service capabilities, and a content ecosystem of 'eating, drinking, and entertainment' with user review systems. These strengths required a decade of relentless effort and organizational-level transformation.
AutoNavi? Nearly half its employees work on ride-hailing. Its core KPIs are navigation accuracy and DAU. Its product managers think about 'how to get users to their destinations faster,' not 'how to make them order boba tea before arriving.'
Take AutoNavi''s 2023 launch of Starbucks'' 'Drive-Thru Pickup'—users could order coffee during navigation and grab it without leaving their car when passing the store. This seemingly perfect contextual innovation flopped. Why? Users open AutoNavi thinking, 'Where am I going?' not 'What am I buying?' When consumption decisions share a screen with travel decisions, the former always becomes secondary.
A source close to AutoNavi bluntly stated: 'As a tool, AutoNavi doesn''t need to care whether users choose Koubei or Meituan for offline services—it just needs to get them where they want to go. There''s no need for coupon-based traffic generation; that''s not what tools do.'
This reveals the truth: AutoNavi has never truly decided whether to be a tool or a platform.
Yu Yongfu''s 'Map Dream' vs. Guo Ning''s 'Profit Era'
When Yu Yongfu took over AutoNavi in 2015, he made a bold move—scrapping O2O and commercialization to return AutoNavi to its 'single map' tool essence. This decision skyrocketed its user base from 200 million to 500 million, cementing its dominance in China''s navigation market.
Ironically, this very strategy that made AutoNavi successful became its shackle for future transformation.
In 2021, Alibaba merged AutoNavi, Local Services, and Fliggy into a 'Lifestyle Services' division under Yu Yongfu''s leadership. He proposed a grand vision: a single map encompassing clothing, food, housing, and transportation, elevating AutoNavi from a 'navigation tool' to an 'Open Service Platform for Better Life Outside.' After Koubei''s 2023 integration, he even dubbed AutoNavi and Ele.me as two 'land products'—offline and home-based user strongholds.
Yet, the 'land' existed, but nothing grew.
Under Yu Yongfu, AutoNavi pursued a 'comprehensive' approach: food Group buying , travel bookings, entertainment, real estate, car washes, maintenance—virtually every offline business. But as one analyst noted: 'AutoNavi''s ventures are all large markets with small stakes. It has shallow presence across multiple fields, only reaching information dissemination without deep transactional engagement.'
This resembles PC-era 58.com—offering everything but mastering nothing. In the LBS-dominated mobile internet era, this 'information yellow pages' model was dismantled by vertical giants like Meituan, Ctrip, and Beike.
In March 2024, Yu Yongfu stepped down, and Guo Ning, a veteran who led AutoNavi''s infrastructure, middleware, and business units, took over as CEO. The situation he inherited was more challenging. By then, Alibaba had merged Ele.me and Fliggy into its China E-Commerce Business Group, forming a synergistic 'Instant Retail + Local Services' system with Taobao Flash Sales, while AutoNavi was left in the 'All Other Businesses' category—essentially abandoned.
Guo Ning''s approach was pragmatic: retreat from local services and focus on travel. Since 2024, AutoNavi has doubled down on ride-sharing and electric vehicle charging/swapping, while local services faded into the background. The September 2025 launch of AutoNavi Street Rankings, built on a 'never-commercialized' ranking list (leaderboard) to establish content credibility, reflected uncertainty about converting that credibility into transactions. This move appeared offensive but served defensive purposes.
From Yu Yongfu''s 'Growth Era' to Guo Ning''s 'Profit Era,' AutoNavi learned a hard lesson: You can''t win on someone else''s home turf.
What Local Services Truly Require: Meituan and Douyin''s Dimensional Strikes
AutoNavi''s failure in local services isn''t due to insufficient effort but a misunderstanding of the sector''s essence.
Local services aren''t a traffic game—they''re a supply game. Meituan founder Wang Xing famously stated: 'Meituan''s core competitiveness (competitive edge) is its 'ground-level iron army.'' This force measured every Chinese city street during the brutal 'Thousand-Group War,' building deep connections with millions of merchants. These ties transcended traffic—they were contractual, service-based, and trust-driven.
Douyin attacked from another dimension, using short videos and livestreams to reconstruct local services'' 'discovery mechanism.' Users scrolling videos get 'seeded' by a hotpot restaurant exploration clip and immediately purchase a Group buying (group deal). This 'content-as-consumption' model helped Douyin rapidly seize offline market share between 2023–2024, becoming Meituan''s most feared rival.
Meituan wins through 'depth'; Douyin through 'novelty.' AutoNavi? It lacks Meituan''s ground-level DNA and Douyin''s content ecosystem. All it has is 'location.' But a location is just a coordinate—miles removed from actual consumption decisions.
Critically, local services are a 'high-frequency beats low-frequency' battleground. Users open Meituan or Douyin far more often than AutoNavi. With Meituan having established 'eating, drinking, and entertainment' mindset and Douyin cultivating 'swipe-and-buy-voucher' habits, why would users pause navigation to buy a Group buying coupon?
An Alibaba insider once reflected: 'After six years of business adjustments and personnel changes following Ele.me''s Alibaba integration, it never developed a local services traffic entry point comparable to Meituan.' This issue plagues AutoNavi too. Alibaba isn''t short on resources—it lacks respect for local services'' operational logic.
Alibaba Figures It Out: Taobao Flash Sales'' 'Sun Tzu Strategy'
In 2025, Alibaba dropped a bombshell in local services: Taobao Flash Sales.
On April 30, Taobao''s 'Hourly Delivery' upgraded to 'Taobao Flash Sales,' securing a primary traffic entrance on Taobao''s homepage via Ele.me''s delivery network. In six days, orders surpassed 10 million; by late 2025, daily orders peaked at 120 million, overtaking Meituan''s 45.0% market share with 45.2% in Q4.
This battle''s strategic significance transcended the food delivery market. Alibaba aimed to close the loop between 'long-distance e-commerce' and 'near-field retail,' using instant retail''s high frequency to boost Taobao''s low engagement. As one analyst noted: 'Alibaba isn''t fighting for delivery market share—it''s fighting for Taobao''s open rate. If Meituan takes high-frequency consumption, Taobao is truly at risk.'
In June 2025, Alibaba formally merged Ele.me and Fliggy into its China E-Commerce Business Group under Jiang Fan''s leadership. By November, the Ele.me app even rebranded as 'Taobao Flash Sales,' fully transforming from an independent delivery platform into Alibaba''s 'fulfillment infrastructure' for instant retail.
These moves reflected Alibaba''s strategic shift.
Alibaba abandoned 'independent operations' for local services, instead integrating them into its e-commerce core. Leveraging Taobao''s traffic, Tmall''s brands, Alipay''s payments, and Cainiao''s logistics, it formed a coordinated 'army group' offensive.
This contrasted sharply with AutoNavi''s path. While AutoNavi oscillated between 'map tool' and 'lifestyle platform,' attempting to load all scenarios onto a single map, Taobao Flash Sales cleanly merged 'e-commerce + instant retail'—users already shopped on Taobao; now, 'next-day delivery' became '30-minute delivery' with minimal mindset shift.
Critically, Taobao Flash Sales solved AutoNavi''s unsolvable problem: transactional depth. AutoNavi could only 'match information,' while Taobao Flash Sales completed the full loop of traffic, transactions, payments, and fulfillment. This depth is local services'' true moat.
AutoNavi''s 'Optimal Solution': Accept Reality, Focus on Travel
Returning to the original question: Why can''t AutoNavi Maps crack local services?
The answer is simple: It''s a tool, and tools have inherent limits.
Google Maps faced similar global struggles with local services, but Google''s solution was to delegate local services to Google Search and Google Assistant while returning maps to navigation fundamentals. AutoNavi''s issue stems from Alibaba''s 'both-and' approach—demanding AutoNavi excel at navigation while carrying local services'' banner and transforming into a 'spatial intelligence entity' in the AI era.
But user mindset is unforgiving. When you open AutoNavi, your brain enters 'travel mode,' not 'consumption mode.' The cost of switching this mindset far exceeds product managers'' imaginations.
Guo Ning seems to recognize this. In Q4 2024, AutoNavi achieved profitability for the first time, with its AI assistant 'Xiao Gao Laoshi' hitting 1.2 billion daily calls. These results prove AutoNavi''s travel fundamentals remain solid. Instead of struggling in local services'' red ocean, it should perfect navigation, empower AI in travel scenarios, and become a 'smarter tool.'
As for local services? Leave it to Taobao Flash Sales. Group army tactics are the right approach—let professionals handle their domains instead of forcing integrations.
Epilogue
The wall of mindset is harder to dismantle than technological barriers.
AutoNavi Maps'' local services struggle mirrors China''s internet industry''s evolution. It teaches us that traffic isn''t a master key, resource pile-ups can''t buy user mindset, and tool-type product transformations are far tougher than imagined.
Meituan spent a decade building 'eating, drinking, and entertainment' mindset; Douyin reshaped 'discovery-to-consumption' via content. AutoNavi spent five years proving one truth: maps lead to destinations, not consumption.
Rather than letting AutoNavi keep sinking in local services'' quicksand, it should focus on winnable battles. For AutoNavi, this doesn''t mean failure.
Embracing its 'tool' identity might be a blessing. In this AI-reconstructed era, a 'spatial intelligence entity' with nearly 1 billion MAUs and 1.5 billion daily kilometers navigated holds far greater value than a half-baked local services platform.
Not every product needs to be a super app. Sometimes, being the sharpest knife beats being a Swiss Army knife that can''t cut anything properly—with far more dignity.