On March 19, 2026, VOYAH, Dongfeng Group's premium new energy vehicle (NEV) brand, made its debut on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange through an introduction listing, earning the distinction of being the 'first premium NEV stock among central and state-owned enterprises.'

However, Dongfeng Group's much-anticipated capital market entrance ended in a disastrous 'black opening.'

VOYAH opened at HK$7.5 per share on its first trading day, with the stock price continuing to decline after the market opened, hitting a session low of HK$6.25 per share. By the close of trading, the stock price stood at HK$6.51 per share, marking a 13.2% single-day decline and a total market value of just HK$23.957 billion.

In stark contrast to the stock price plunge was Dongfeng Group's grand narrative of 'parent retreats, child advances' in capital operations. Just one trading day before VOYAH's listing, Dongfeng Group shares officially ended their 20-year listing history on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and completed privatization and delisting.

According to Dongfeng Group's plan, the core purpose of this strategic restructuring was to overcome the valuation dilemma faced by traditional fuel vehicle companies in the Hong Kong stock market. By pushing VOYAH, a core new energy asset, into the capital market, Dongfeng aimed to achieve higher valuation pricing and stronger financing liquidity.

However, the market performance on the first day of listing exposed a significant gap between expectations and reality, undermining this carefully designed capital maneuver from the outset.

Dongfeng's High-Stakes Privatization Gamble

Looking back to 2005, Dongfeng Group shares were listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, setting a record for the largest initial public offering (IPO) in the global automotive industry that year and marking a significant milestone in the capitalization of China's automotive sector.

However, two decades later, this veteran automaker found itself trapped in a dual dilemma of valuation and liquidity in the Hong Kong stock market.

By the time of privatization suspension, Dongfeng Group shares had a price-to-book ratio consistently below 0.5 times, even falling below 0.1 times at its lowest, effectively losing its equity refinancing function. Dongfeng Group bluntly stated in its announcement, 'It has basically lost the financing function of the H-share listing platform.'

The valuation dilemma, in essence, reflects the capital market's pessimistic pricing of the transformation prospects of traditional fuel vehicle companies.

Dongfeng Group's dilemma extends far beyond the superficial issue of 'low valuation.' Behind it lies a complex situation intertwined with multiple crises, including the collapse of the traditional joint venture model, the high cost of independent transformation, the ineffectiveness of capital market logic, and internal governance challenges.

Previously, Dongfeng Group's performance heavily relied on the fuel vehicle businesses of joint venture brands such as Dongfeng Nissan and Dongfeng Honda. However, with the rapid increase in the penetration rate of new energy vehicles, sales of these joint venture brands have continued to decline.

Throughout 2025, Dongfeng Honda's sales fell by 23.92% year-on-year, Dongfeng Nissan's by 4.94%, and Dongfeng Peugeot Citroën's by 24.61%, directly leading to losses in the group's performance.

Hong Kong stock investors have lost interest in traditional integrated automaker groups like Dongfeng, which are dominated by 'fuel vehicles + joint venture businesses.'

Under such fundamentals, even if VOYAH, as the core carrier of new energy transformation, achieves breakthroughs in sales and profitability, it has consistently failed to be reflected in the overall valuation, instead being dragged down by the sluggish performance of traditional businesses.

Spinning off VOYAH for listing essentially involves divesting a high-quality asset that has been 'dragged down' from the parent company to seek an independent valuation system and financing possibilities.

In Dongfeng Group's narrative, this operation is a 'retreat for better advancement.' To support this capital operation, the sponsor and securities firms have also given extremely high valuation expectations.

In a research report in January 2026, the sole sponsor, CICC, pointed out that as a 'premium new energy profit target among central and state-owned enterprises,' VOYAH's reasonable valuation should reference the price-to-sales ratio level of Li Auto. Based on 2025 revenue of RMB 34.86 billion, this corresponds to an estimated valuation of approximately HK$71.4 billion, with a per-share value of about HK$19.45. During the same period, CLSA gave an even higher target price of HK$22.

The Embarrassment of a 21x Price-to-Earnings Ratio

However, events often unfold contrary to expectations. The core reason for the stock price plunge on the first day of listing was the market's non-recognition of VOYAH's current valuation.

By the close of trading on the listing day, VOYAH's trailing twelve months (TTM) price-to-earnings ratio was 21.27 times, almost on par with BYD's Hong Kong stock price-to-earnings ratio of 22.19 times.

However, in terms of performance scale, growth certainty, or industrial chain competitiveness, there is a significant gap between VOYAH and BYD.

From a financial perspective, VOYAH did achieve a superficial breakthrough in performance in 2025. Its annual revenue was RMB 34.865 billion, up 65.4% year-on-year; it achieved a net profit of RMB 1.017 billion, marking its first annual profit, and its gross profit margin increased from 14.2% in 2023 to 20.9%.

However, a breakdown of the profit structure reveals obvious shortcomings in profit quality.

Prospectus data shows that government-related subsidies included in VOYAH's 2025 financials amounted to RMB 1.08 billion, exceeding the period's net profit attributable to shareholders.

This means that after excluding non-recurring items such as government subsidies, VOYAH's core business remains in a loss-making state, with significant uncertainty regarding profit sustainability.

The insufficient sales scale is the core weakness of VOYAH's valuation.

In 2025, VOYAH's annual sales were 150,200 vehicles, up 87% year-on-year, but there is a significant gap compared to leading new energy vehicle companies.

Moreover, the sales figure of 150,000 vehicles failed to meet VOYAH's set target, falling short by 50,000 vehicles and achieving only three-quarters of the 2025 sales target.

Compared to other automakers, BYD sold 4.6 million vehicles in 2025, Leapmotor nearly 600,000, XIAOMI and Li Auto over 400,000, and Changan Automobile's Deepal sold 330,000.

In the context of the Matthew effect continuing to intensify in the new energy vehicle industry, an annual sales scale of 150,000 vehicles just touches the industry's recognized 'survival line' of 100,000 vehicles and has yet to form sufficient economies of scale. Whether in terms of supply chain bargaining power or the ability to amortize R&D investment, there is a huge gap compared to leading companies.

Comparing horizontally with industry valuation levels, VOYAH's pricing indeed lacks support.

BYD's current Hong Kong stock price-to-earnings ratio is around 22 times, but behind it lies an annual sales scale of over 4.6 million vehicles, cost advantages from vertical integration across the entire industrial chain, a second growth curve from battery and energy storage businesses, and expected performance growth rates of 25%-30%.

Leapmotor, which also achieved its first full-year profit in 2025 with a net profit of RMB 538 million and annual sales of 600,000 vehicles, currently has a price-to-earnings ratio of only 14.3 times, far lower than VOYAH's 21 times.

The Liquidity Trap Under the Double-Edged Sword

The introduction listing model chosen by VOYAH is also a significant reason for the sharp stock price fluctuations on the first day of listing and has planted numerous hidden dangers for its subsequent capital operations.

Unlike conventional IPOs that issue new shares to raise funds, the core feature of introduction listing is 'listing only, no share issuance, no financing.' It merely lists the shares held by existing shareholders for circulation on the exchange, without introducing new investors or a price discovery process for new share issuance throughout the listing process.

This listing method allows for a quick listing and the establishment of an independent capital platform, creating conditions for subsequent refinancing, which is the core reason Dongfeng Group chose this model.

However, the other side of the double-edged sword is the absence of institutional pricing and anchor investors during the IPO process, with the stock price entirely determined by market transactions. Moreover, the shares held by original shareholders can be traded immediately upon listing, making it highly susceptible to a stock price plunge caused by concentrated selling.

The 11.09% turnover rate on the first day of listing was essentially the result of original shareholders selling their allocated VOYAH shares and exiting en masse.

A more severe challenge, and a previously unsolved dilemma for Dongfeng Group shares, is liquidity differentiation.

For VOYAH, the trading volume of HK$651 million on the first day of listing is likely the peak driven by short-term trading sentiment, with subsequent trading volumes expected to shrink rapidly. Once liquidity becomes sluggish, it will not only further exacerbate stock price volatility but also directly lead to the complete ineffectiveness of its core purpose of listing—financing.

Meanwhile, Dongfeng Group's privatization has also incurred extremely high costs, with cumulative cash consideration expenditures exceeding HK$14.6 billion.

The expected return on this high-stakes gamble is the valuation increase of VOYAH after listing, covering the privatization costs through the revaluation of state-owned assets. However, VOYAH's market value of around HK$24 billion on the first day of listing, nearly halving from the institution's expected valuation of HK$43 billion, puts Dongfeng Group's original intention of 'achieving value preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets at a higher valuation' at risk of failure.

A Long and Arduous Journey Amid Industry Intense Competition

Meanwhile, the capital market's cautious attitude is essentially a rational judgment of VOYAH's future development prospects.

In 2026, China's new energy vehicle industry has shifted from a past period of incremental growth to a new stage of intense competition in the existing market. The China Association of Automobile Manufacturers predicts that domestic new energy vehicle sales will reach approximately 19 million units in 2026, up 15.2% year-on-year, with growth significantly slowing compared to the doubling growth rates of previous years, and industry competition shifting from 'low-price internal competition' to 'survival competition.'

The current trend of concentration in the new energy vehicle market continues to intensify, with the industry's top three companies (CR3) reaching 50% and the top ten (CR10) expected to rise to 90%, with leading companies occupying over 80% of the market share.

Brands with annual sales of less than 200,000 vehicles will face multiple dilemmas, including weak supply chain bargaining power, high channel costs, and insufficient R&D investment, and will gradually be eliminated from the market.

At the segment level, VOYAH's main focus on the premium new energy market priced between RMB 200,000 and RMB 400,000 has become the most fiercely competitive 'red ocean battlefield' in the industry.

VOYAH lacks sufficient user perception and product definition capabilities, lacks cost advantages across the entire industrial chain, and lacks independent intelligent empowerment, resulting in insufficient product differentiation and limited brand premium capabilities. It can only exchange sales volume for terminal discounts, further diluting its already fragile profit margins.

VOYAH views global expansion as an important growth driver and has entered over 40 countries and regions. However, from an actual perspective, overseas sales account for an extremely low proportion and have yet to achieve economies of scale.

Moreover, leading companies such as BYD, Geely, and SAIC have already completed capacity deployment and channel construction in overseas markets, establishing first-mover advantages.

Meanwhile, with the decline in the parent company's ability to provide financial support, whether VOYAH can sustain its development through self-generated cash flow remains a huge question mark.

Of course, for VOYAH, the Hong Kong stock listing is just a beginning, not an end.

Whether it can achieve the group's strategic goal of 'taking one step back to take two steps forward' depends on whether VOYAH can truly deliver competitive products, achieve sustained profitability in its core business, and build its own core barriers.

However, with the current starting point, everything is 'difficult.'