A rocket that has completed development and testing and arrived at the launch site doesn't automatically secure a launch mission. It must wait for an available pad, undergo complete rocket-ground system integration, and coordinate site plans, airspace and sea areas, as well as tracking resources. Only when all these conditions are met does this industrial product, fresh from the factory, truly earn the right to take off.

But that's just the initial qualification. An invisible barrier stands between the launch tower and the sky, and the key to overcoming this barrier isn't entirely in the hands of rocket companies.

China's commercial space industry is grappling with a paradoxical situation: general-purpose launch pads are in high demand, with new rocket models eagerly awaiting launch opportunities. At the same time, an increasing number of companies are constructing dedicated launch pads. Despite the growing number of pads, the industry still perceives a shortage of launch resources.

The issue isn't simply a lack of launch pads. Many pads are exclusively tied to specific companies, rocket models, and ground systems. This means that the numerical increase in pads doesn't fully translate into an increase in available launch capacity.

General-purpose pads are in high demand, while dedicated pads may operate at low capacity for extended periods. The launch dilemma in the commercial space sector appears to stem from a shortage of launch towers on the surface, but it actually reflects a deeper lack of a launch system capable of accommodating multiple rocket models and ensuring stable launch turnover.

01

Launch pads are often envisioned as airport runways, where different rockets can take turns using them as long as they're large enough. In reality, a liquid rocket launch pad is more like the other half of the rocket that remains on the ground.

The ground system is responsible for rocket transportation, erection, and fixation; propellant storage and loading; transmission of fluids, power, and commands through rocket-ground umbilicals and detachment plugs; gas venting; and the activation of fire protection and emergency systems.

Different rockets have varying propellant combinations, diameters, takeoff masses, and engine counts, leading to distinct erection methods, loading procedures, and ignition sequences. Even if a rocket can stand next to the same tower, it doesn't mean the entire ground system can directly serve it.

In the traditional space system, the approach of "one model, one pad, dedicated support" had engineering logic and reasonableness. With a limited number of rocket models in the past, national missions prioritized reliability, and dedicated pads could be deeply customized for a single rocket series. However, with the advent of commercial space, the number of rocket models has rapidly increased. If this model were simply replicated, it would easily become "one model, one pad, one company, one pad."

Companies building their own pads isn't solely about displaying assets. General-purpose pads require coordinating with other missions, and new rocket models must undergo equipment adaptation, joint testing, and full-system rehearsals for integration. Liquid rockets in their maiden flight and rapid iteration phases may experience continuous changes in configuration and procedures. Long-term stable use of a single pad allows for synchronous design of the rocket-ground system and reduces coordination costs.

Therefore, building dedicated pads cannot be uniformly dismissed as redundant construction. For rockets with special configurations, dense mission schedules, or those in high-intensity testing phases, dedicated pads can indeed improve engineering efficiency.

According to public reports in May 2026, at least five commercial rocket companies in China—LandSpace, Space Pioneer, CAS Space, China Rocket, and Galactic Energy—have built their own dedicated launch pads, all located in the Dongfeng Commercial Space Innovation Test Zone in Jiuquan. Currently, there is no unified, verifiable public list of companies applying for additional pads. Signing in, starting design, applying for approval, beginning construction, and completing and commissioning are five entirely different states and should not be conflated.

More importantly, companies typically build a single pad within a nationally recognized launch site, not an entire launch site that can operate independently of the public system.

Under current regulations, spacecraft orbit insertion missions must be conducted at nationally recognized launch sites. Before applying for a launch permit, companies must complete technical coordination with the launch site, and the safety of the flight corridor and landing areas involving land, air, and sea domains must be organized uniformly.

This means that while dedicated pads can reduce uncertainty in rocket-ground adaptation and internal company scheduling, they cannot bypass launch permits, airspace and sea area coordination, tracking arrangements, and public safety regulations. A company-built pad determines where the rocket stands but does not solely decide when it flies.

The industry often refers to "waiting for a launch window," which actually mixes several concepts. A strict launch window is determined by the target orbit and mission conditions. What companies often wait for are pad scheduling, site plans, airspace and sea area coordination, tracking resources, and permits. Attributing all waiting to a "lack of launch pads" can easily overestimate the role of additional towers.

02

If dedicated pads cannot solve all problems, are general-purpose pads the solution?

The No. 2 pad at the Hainan Commercial Space Launch Site provides an important example. Designed with a maximum envelope of a 5-meter core diameter, it adopts a "three-horizontal" mode—horizontal assembly, horizontal testing, and horizontal transport—and uses interchangeable equipment and modular interfaces to accommodate different rockets. According to the constructor's public introduction, the pad's design capacity can meet the launch needs of more than ten rocket models.

This at least proves that there is no physical law requiring "one rocket, one pad" for liquid rockets. As long as rockets and the launch site unify design boundaries, a single pad can serve multiple models.

However, "general-purpose" can easily become a misused label.

A general-purpose pad is not a universal outlet for any rocket. It can only achieve generality within a predefined envelope. If a rocket's diameter, takeoff mass, propellant combination, or testing mode exceeds the boundaries, equipment modifications are still needed. Even within the adaptation range, new rocket models must undergo interface verification, software debugging, ground matching tests, and full-system rehearsals before integration.

The number of rocket types a pad can adapt to describes its design coverage capability; the number of model switches and launch missions it can complete in a year reflects its effective supply. If each switch requires lengthy modifications, a pad nominally compatible with twenty rockets doesn't mean those rockets can take off in sequence at any time.

Beyond fixed land-based pads, sea-based launches offer another model.

Sea-based launches replace fixed land-based towers with offshore platforms. The home port handles assembly testing, satellite-rocket integration, sea transport, and command support. The rocket is then transported to a designated sea area, making the launch point mobile and offering greater flexibility in selecting the launch direction and debris landing zones.

The Eastern Spaceport has established a support chain from assembly testing to sea-based launch, serving multiple solid rocket models. The Jielong 3 even launched from Haiyang, sailing over 1,300 nautical miles before firing near Yangjiang, Guangdong, verifying long-distance mobile launch capabilities.

This proves that rockets do not necessarily need their own fixed land-based pad but still require a complete launch system. Sea-based launches reduce reliance on permanent land-based towers and fixed launch directions but do not eliminate the need for home ports, launch vessels, tracking communications, air-sea domain control, and safety guarantees.

Sea-based launches are not a shortcut replicable by all rockets. Currently, regular sea-based launches in China primarily involve solid rockets. Solid rockets can be fully integrated on land and do not require large-scale cryogenic propellant loading after sailing. Large liquid rockets must address propellant storage and transport, platform motion, rocket stability, and sea state adaptation, with engineering complexity far exceeding existing solid sea-based launch modes.

Thus, sea-based launches expand launch corridors but cannot simply replace land-based liquid pads. They resemble a mobile route rather than a highway accessible to all rockets.

Dedicated pads offer stronger model control but are constrained by a single company's mission rhythm; general-purpose pads pursue infrastructure reuse but incur costs for new model integration and model switching; sea-based launches expand launch direction and landing zone options but are limited in applicable rocket types. This is why more pads are built, yet the industry still feels insufficient. While facilities on maps can keep increasing, the number of effective pads providing complete services for a specific rocket at a given time does not grow as quickly.

03

SpaceX is often cited to prove the importance of dedicated pads, but it does not suggest that "all rocket companies must build their own launch sites."

The Falcon 9 currently launches from pads within three government facilities, with SpaceX gaining strong facility control and scheduling capabilities through leasing, modifications, and long-term operations. The Starbase in Texas is an integrated manufacturing, testing, launch, and recovery base built around the Starship.

However, operational control does not mean companies can decide everything. SpaceX remains subject to U.S. Federal Aviation Administration permits, public safety, environmental assessments, and airspace regulations. Increasing Starship launch frequency or changing flight trajectories also requires applying for or modifying permits.

What truly deserves study about SpaceX is not how many towers it owns but how it combines a relatively stable rocket lineup, growing orders, and long-term operated pads. The Falcon 9 has a high enough launch frequency to amortize pad construction and maintenance costs; the same rocket family can use relatively stable ground interfaces long-term, reducing repeated adaptations.

Dedicated pads become efficiency tools in SpaceX's hands not because towers possess some magic but because behind them stands a mature product with sustained mission demand and high-frequency launch validation. Without stable orders and launch frequency, simply imitating dedicated pads cannot replicate SpaceX's success.

China's commercial space industry will not choose between "all dedicated" and "all general-purpose" in the future. Liquid rocket families with stable orders and high launch frequencies can use dedicated or long-term leased pads; models with limited mission frequencies and gradually standardized rocket-ground interfaces are better suited for general-purpose pads; solid rockets facilitating integrated transport and rapid erection can make more use of sea-based mobile launch platforms. Special propellants, configurations, and high-intensity testing missions will still require dedicated facilities.

What truly determines whether this system can operate is not just building more pads but unifying rocket-ground interfaces, design envelopes, testing procedures, and access standards, so that companies purchase not a vague "window" but a clearly defined, periodically predictable launch site service.

Policy directions have begun to shift. The 2021 White Paper on China's Space Activities proposes promoting universal, intensive, and intelligent launch site construction; the 2026 Commercial Space Standard System (Version 1.0) further calls for establishing access, adaptation, and procedural service standards around commercial launch sites to support maximizing asset and resource utilization; the National Space Administration's Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality and Safe Development of Commercial Space (2025-2027) requires optimizing industrial spatial layout to avoid low-level redundant construction. This means the next phase of launch site construction must shift evaluation criteria from "how many towers are erected" to "how much stable, reusable mission capacity is formed."

A general-purpose pad capable of high-frequency turnover may be closer to commercial infrastructure than several low-frequency dedicated pads; a dedicated pad used long-term by a high-frequency launch model and capable of rapid recovery may also be more efficient than a nominally general-purpose but slow-switching pad; a sea-based launch platform and home port system capable of continuous missions may also hold greater commercial value than towers fixed onshore.

General-purpose, dedicated, and sea-based mobile pads have never been a distinction between advanced and backward. Utilization rate, turnover speed, access cost, and mission certainty are the true metrics for commercial launches.

Commercial space needs more launch resources but should not let the growing number of rocket models each match a growing number of dedicated facilities, using unfulfilled launch demand to justify this capital-intensive expansion.

Not every rocket needs its own fixed pad, but every rocket needs a validated, stably available launch system. It could be a dedicated tower, a general-purpose pad, or a sea-based launch platform. Rocket-ground interfaces are specialized, but that doesn't mean pads must be exclusive. Securing pad access does not equate to mastering the entire launch process. Once these are conflated, pad numbers may keep increasing, but truly available launch capacity may not grow synchronously.

Rockets must ultimately leave the ground. Only by surpassing that barrier does manufacturing capability truly translate into space transportation capability. To measure commercial space launch capacity, one should look at how many rockets these towers and sea platforms can stably send off annually and at what turnover speed, not how many towers stand on the ground.

This article is the third installment in the "Demystifying Commercial Space" series. Next, we will dismantle the technological halo of "large diameter." Does a thicker rocket necessarily mean it is more advanced?