Introduction

“Elon Musk predicts 2026 will mark a ‘watershed moment’ for human civilization.”

Indeed, spring 2026 could represent China’s final opportunity to determine whether it will assume a ‘leading role’ or a ‘supporting role’ in the future of transportation.

As the U.S. Congress passes the , Tesla’s Cybercab—a model without a steering wheel—is poised for mass production, while Waymo aggressively expands into London and Tokyo. Meanwhile, China’s Apollo Go has already been chauffeuring dignitaries in Dubai, yet most autonomous vehicles in China remain confined to ‘experimental zones’ spanning tens or hundreds of square kilometers within select cities.

Several CPPCC members and industry experts argue that China’s self-driving sector is at a ‘singularity moment,’ necessitating urgent policy innovation, scenario expansion, and institutional restructuring to transition from testing to large-scale deployment.

The (WeChat Official Account: Self-Driving Vehicle Era) asserts that it is time to abandon the label of ‘cautious pilot projects’ and accelerate institutional breakthroughs and scenario openings with unprecedented speed.

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I. Global Race: U.S. Legislation Unleashes Potential, While China Hesitates?

In February 2026, the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee unanimously approved the , officially permitting L4 vehicles without steering wheels or pedals to operate legally on public roads—a historic move removing federal legal barriers to fully autonomous driving.

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Almost simultaneously, Tesla announced mass production of its Cybercab in April, while Waymo accelerated its entry into high-barrier markets like Japan and the UK.

In contrast, despite partial full-autonomy operations in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, cross-regional coordination remains limited (with only six Guangdong cities establishing autonomous driving reciprocity).

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Apollo Go operates freely in Beijing’s Yizhuang but downgrades or shuts down upon reaching Tongzhou’s border.

This ‘administrative fragmentation’ prevents companies from validating critical capabilities like cross-city dispatch and highway connectivity, let alone building a nationwide service network.

An even more urgent issue is the legal vacuum.

China’s current still defines ‘drivers’ as human operators, leaving accident liability for self-driving vehicles in legal limbo.

Ao Li, Vice President of the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, emphasized:

“We must swiftly grant autonomous driving systems ‘legal subject status,’ clarify liability boundaries among manufacturers, operators, and software providers, and establish new insurance mechanisms.”

“Otherwise, no matter how advanced the technology, companies will hesitate to deploy at scale—after all, a single accident with ambiguous liability could derail an entire project.”

II. The Singularity Arrives: Self-Driving as a Mobile AI Entity

Why the urgency?

Because self-driving has evolved beyond ‘transportation’ to become the first frontier of embodied AI (Embodied AI).

Li Meng, CPPCC member and former Vice Minister of Science and Technology, stated bluntly: “Autonomous driving is the first product paving the way toward embodied AGI.” Unlike ‘disembodied intelligence’ like ChatGPT, which operates solely in the digital realm, self-driving vehicles must perceive, decide, and act in the physical world—they possess ‘bodies’ capable of reshaping reality.

The value of this ‘body’ exceeds expectations.

In Wuhan, 95% of 1,727 passengers who rode Apollo Go expressed willingness to continue using the service, with over 70% expecting it to become their primary mode of transportation.

Users no longer focus solely on ‘getting from A to B’ but enjoy ‘mobile private spaces’ for karaoke, massage, and office work—precisely what Lu Peng, Vice Dean of the Wuhan Institute of Artificial Intelligence at Peking University, calls ‘incremental service value.’

Meanwhile, in mining areas, 500 autonomous mining trucks from HiDi are enabling zero-carbon extraction;

in Zhaoqing’s New Year market, Lingxiaoju P67 robots deliver Zongzi 24/7;

and in Minqing, Fuzhou, postal drones have doubled rural delivery frequency...

These cases demonstrate that L4 autonomous driving is not merely a technological demonstration but a productivity tool addressing real-world challenges.

This is why Wang Jiangping, CPPCC member and former Vice Minister of Industry and Information Technology, stressed that smart vehicles have entered an ‘AI-native’ phase—where AI is no longer an add-on but the product’s core. Whoever first achieves large-scale L3/L4 commercialization will shape the next generation of automotive design, business models, and even urban infrastructure.

III. Breaking the Deadlock: From ‘Fragmented Zones’ to ‘Regional Clusters’

Faced with these challenges, CPPCC members propose clear and bold solutions: dismantle administrative barriers and establish 5–10 regional-scale autonomous driving engineering verification platforms.

Wang Xianjin, CPPCC member and Vice President of the China Academy of Transportation Sciences, identified five potential regions: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, Greater Bay Area, Chengdu-Chongqing, and Hainan Island. Take Hainan as an example: its island-wide enclosure, stable climate, and strong tourism demand make it ideal for pioneering integrated operations of self-driving taxis, buses, and sanitation vehicles, creating a ‘Chinese Robotaxi Demonstration Zone.’

Simultaneously, policies must shift from ‘control-oriented’ to ‘openness-oriented.’

Zhong Zhangdai, CPPCC member and Dean of the Institute of Digital Intelligent Rail Transit at Beijing Jiaotong University, suggested adding ‘institutional open spaces’ to the (Document No. 97), allowing localities to pilot new vehicle models, services, and modes. For instance, permitting autonomous logistics vehicles to use bus lanes during off-peak nights or granting ‘dynamic road rights’ in specific commercial districts—where vehicles can apply for temporary access based on real-time traffic conditions.

More critically, ‘use-driven research’ is essential.

Xue Lan, Counselor of the State Council and Dean of Tsinghua University’s Institute for AI International Governance, noted that the slowest part of technological diffusion is never the lab but the ‘technology-society system’ integration. Instead of waiting for perfect solutions, vehicles should be deployed first, allowing regulations, insurance, and ethical frameworks to evolve through real-world interactions. Wuhan’s experience shows that user trust grows exponentially with experience. Only through large-scale operations can sufficient data be collected to optimize algorithms, creating a virtuous cycle of ‘data—experience—trust—scale.’

IV. Conclusion: Sprint or Be Left Behind

In 2026, global autonomous driving stands at the edge of a singularity cliff.

The U.S. opts for legislative openness and capital frenzy;

Europe prioritizes ethics and safety;

while China, boasting the world’s richest application soil, grapples with institutional inertia.

The collective voice of CPPCC members and industry experts serves as both a wake-up call and a rallying cry.

We can no longer settle for empty titles like ‘world’s largest testing mileage’ or ‘most pilot cities.’

In short, the (WeChat Official Account: Self-Driving Vehicle Era) argues:

Time waits for no one! After the singularity, it’s either sprint or be left behind.

This time, we must let self-driving vehicles roam freely across China rather than trap them in approval forms.

What do you think, dear reader?

#SelfDrivingVehicleEra #SelfDriving #AutonomousDriving #SelfDrivingCars