Introduction

From "Story-Listening" to "Financial Statement-Reading"

Since 2026, the capital market landscape for new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has become sharply polarized.

VOYAH made its debut on the Hong Kong stock exchange in March of this year, only to witness its stock price plummet by 13% on the first day, casting a somewhat frosty atmosphere. Despite Seres experiencing a 43.9% year-on-year increase in first-quarter sales, its stock price has been on a downward spiral since listing, even being downgraded by Citi. In stark contrast, Geely not only led in first-quarter sales but also saw its stock price hit a four-year peak.

This contrast sends a clear signal: the market's attitude towards automakers has become increasingly divergent.

Previously, investors might have been more inclined to pay for "growth potential" and "innovative concepts." However, now, particularly amidst heightened external economic volatility, they are placing greater emphasis on tangible profitability, technological foundations, and risk resilience. The cooling reception of Seres and VOYAH precisely mirrors their shortcomings in meeting these new challenges.

Investors Shift from "Story-Listening" to "Financial Statement-Reading"

In recent years, both the NEV market and the capital market have reached a critical inflection point. The industry has transitioned from a boom phase to a knockout stage, and investors' mindsets have undergone a fundamental transformation.

First and foremost, the most fundamental shift is that investors are no longer solely fixated on sales figures.

A few years ago, monthly sales surpassing 10,000 units or impressive sequential growth rates would make headlines and propel stock prices skyward. Since 2025, with NEV penetration exceeding 50%, the market has entered a stage of stock competition (inventory competition), where relying solely on sales growth can no longer sustain high valuations. The market has begun to focus on enterprises' profit quality, technological moats, and long-term sustainable development capabilities.

Consequently, investors have started to delve deeper: How much profit can an automaker actually generate per vehicle sold? Is this profit derived from its own capabilities or external support?

VOYAH serves as a prime example. Of its 1.017 billion yuan net profit in 2025, government subsidies accounted for a staggering 1.08 billion yuan, leaving its core business still under pressure after deductions. In other words, without subsidies, its core business might still be operating at a loss. This type of profitability, achieved through "external support," naturally lacks persuasiveness in a market that now prioritizes self-sufficiency.

Seres faces similar challenges. While its revenue grew by 13.7% in 2025, its net profit attributable to shareholders increased by a mere 0.18%, and its net profit excluding non-recurring items declined by 7.84% year-on-year. This scenario of revenue growth without corresponding profit growth inevitably raises concerns about its profit quality.

Second, technology has emerged as the new hard currency, and it must be firmly in one's own grasp.

Under the pressure of intensifying technological competition and intelligent transformation, the degree of self-research in capabilities such as intelligent cockpits and autonomous driving directly relates to an automaker's valuation ceiling. However, R&D is a marathon and a costly endeavor. VOYAH's R&D expenditure in 2025 was only 1.36 billion yuan, with an R&D expense ratio of 3.9%, while its selling expenses reached a staggering 5.341 billion yuan, nearly four times its R&D spending. In contrast, leading new forces generally have R&D expense ratios exceeding 10%. This investment structure, which prioritizes marketing over R&D, is difficult to sustain for long-term technological competitiveness.

Furthermore, the Hong Kong stock market is primarily geared towards value investment driven by long-term funds.

These institutional investors place greater emphasis on a company's fundamentals and long-term value, remaining cautious towards short-term speculation and conceptual bubbles. They scrutinize a company's governance structure, the rationality of related-party transactions, and the independence of its business model. Seres' high technical service fees paid to Huawei and VOYAH's reliance on a single model and government subsidies, when subjected to such scrutiny, become risk points that require repeated evaluation rather than "features."

Failing to Do One's Own "Homework"

As the bar is raised by the external environment, shortcomings in one's own "homework" become even more glaring. The issues faced by Seres and VOYAH represent two distinct yet highly representative developmental bottlenecks.

Seres' greatest challenge arises as the "Huawei halo" begins to fade.

In the past, Seres' biggest trump card was its deep integration with Huawei, which allowed it to quickly establish a high-end intelligent brand image and achieve soaring sales initially. However, its success also brought potential challenges.

As Huawei's Hongmeng Zhixing ecosystem expands, encompassing brands from AITO to Xiangjie and Aojie, Seres has transitioned from being an "only child" to "one of several siblings." This dilution of scarcity naturally leads to a discount in the capital market's premium. This forces Seres to confront a question: Beyond the Huawei halo, what core capabilities do you truly possess?

A deeper issue lies in its business model. Industry estimates suggest that for every AITO vehicle Seres sells, it may need to allocate nearly 100,000 yuan to Huawei in technical licensing fees. While this grants access to top-tier technology, it also severely erodes per-vehicle profit margins, leaving the company passive in intense price wars. Despite sales growth, stagnant net profit and even declining net profit excluding non-recurring items indicate that the company has yet to establish an independent and sustainable profit model.

Seres needs to urgently prove that it can not only build great cars but also find an independent path to profitability beyond massive R&D and supply chain costs.

VOYAH, on the other hand, faces the dual challenges of subsidy dependence and a limited product lineup.

Backed by Dongfeng, VOYAH started with high resources and advantages, but its challenge lies in successfully transforming from a "state-backed player" to an independent competitor in the market.

The most criticized aspect is its reliance on subsidies. As mentioned earlier, profitability dependent on subsidies gives investors the impression that the company's market competitiveness has not been fully tested. People invest in companies positioned for the future, not projects that require continuous policy support.

A narrow product lineup is another risk point. Over-reliance on a single model, the Dreamer, is like putting all eggs in one basket—any fluctuation in the niche market can shake the entire company. While VOYAH is striving to introduce new models, breaking through in today's fiercely competitive market is far more challenging than a few years ago.

Ultimately, whether it's the "de-Huaweiization" pressure faced by Seres or the "marketization" test faced by VOYAH, both point to the same core issue: In the second half of the NEV race, companies that can thrive and endure must establish sustainable core competitiveness independent of single external factors.

A Point of Comparison: Why is Geely Recognized?

After discussing so many issues, looking at Geely, which is recognized by the market, helps clarify the current logic. Geely's first-quarter sales and stock price soared together, not because of explosive sales of a single model but because Geely demonstrated a more balanced and solid systemic competitiveness.

Geely did not bet everything on a single brand or partner. Instead, through a brand matrix including Geely, Lynk & Co, and Zeekr, it covers a broad market from mass-market to premium segments, ensuring that if one brand underperforms, others can compensate, thus enhancing risk resilience. More importantly, its profit growth outpaced revenue growth, indicating improving operational efficiency and profit quality rather than mere scale expansion.

At the same time, Geely's investments in self-developed technologies and globalization have also shown investors a longer-term vision.

In short, the market now rewards companies that can walk steadily on their own rather than those that still need to be supported or carried.

Conclusion

The cooling reception of Seres and VOYAH's listings has delivered a vivid capital lesson to all automakers, especially those new brands still climbing the ladder. The theme of this lesson is clear: The era of telling stories and scaling up for the sake of scale is over.

In today's examination room, the difficulty level of the test has been comprehensively upgraded. The questions include: Can automakers generate profits independently? Do they possess core technologies that cannot be replicated by others? Is their product portfolio stable enough?

As external uncertainties continue to rise, the capital market is using stricter criteria to evaluate every automaker. For automakers, the path forward is clear: Reduce reliance on short-term halos and focus more on cultivating long-term internal strengths. Those who can more quickly address their shortcomings and establish solid comprehensive competitiveness will win tickets to the next stage of this brutal differentiation.